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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Today, there is great interest among policy makers and the general public in improving 
public transit in order to revitalize downtowns and reduce the harmful effects of driving 
on the environment. Investments in public transit are costly, and individuals and elected 
representatives will only vote in favor of such projects if they perceive the benefits of such 
investments to exceed the costs. The political economy of popular support for public transit 
investments hinges on the preferences of the median voter. Intuitively, if at least 50% of 
the population supports a specific public transit investment, then it will be enacted when 
voters engage in direct democracy, and it will be more likely to be adopted when elected 
representatives determine transportation priorities.
In the United States and other countries, the median voter has been suburbanizing; 
and few suburbanites rely on public transit systems. This study explores whether this 
suburbanization decreases support for transit infrastructure and other pro-environment 
policies. 
We employ various data sets including individual-level surveys and precinct-level election 
results covering 20 state-level ballot propositions that took place in California between 
1990 and 2010. For decades, California has been a policy trendsetter as shown by its 
ambitious environmental policy and efforts to encourage increased public transit ridership. 
We use these data to test hypotheses concerning support for environmental and transit 
policy and the role of: 
• socio-economic variables, including income and unemployment status,
• household demographics, including age, education and race,
• ideology, and
• urban form attributes, including density, centrality and homeownership status. 
The analysis of 20 propositions spanning two decades documents important characteristics 
of elections and the electorate. Policy makers can use our results to predict how voters in 
certain precincts are likely to vote on various types of transportation-related propositions.
In addition to statistical analysis of all 20 propositions, we also present three case studies 
that provide context as well as use the data to test additional hypotheses. The first case 
study is Proposition 1A from 2008, the California High-Speed Rail Bond Initiative. While 
approved by 52.7% of voters, the high-speed rail project remains controversial. Indeed, a 
proposition to “End the Bullet Train to Nowhere” was circulated for inclusion on the 2012 
ballot, and although it did not qualify, it highlights that changes in public opinion threaten to 
slow future progress on the high-speed rail and similar projects.1
The 2008 election took place in the midst of a serious recession. Our results document 
that, all else being equal, a precinct in a jurisdiction with higher unemployment was only 
somewhat more likely to vote for Prop. 1A. Should a future proposition involve either 
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withdrawing or extending high-speed rail funding, our results can help develop informed 
predictions. Among demographic variables, the likely impact of an aging, increasingly 
educated population, and other questions, can also be gauged in terms of support using 
our results.
Suburbanization appears to have reduced support for High-Speed Rail (HSR). HSR offers 
the greatest benefits to urbanites that can more easily access it. Suburbanites live farther 
from the new transit infrastructure and thus are less likely to use it. Our results document 
the magnitude of this phenomenon. We refer to this as a “price” effect of suburbanization.
In addition to having easier access to HSR, theory predicts that urbanites will also tend 
to see their land values rise from HSR investments. Our results are consistent with this 
prediction; in Central Valley areas, homeowners near future HSR stations were more likely 
to vote “yes” on Prop. 1A than homeowners far from future HSR stations. We refer to 
this as an “investment” effect of suburbanization. Intuitively, suburbanites live farther from 
public transit nodes and thus their homes are less likely to enjoy a windfall capitalization 
effect caused by physical proximity and easy access to the new transit infrastructure. Our 
findings are thus consistent with increasing suburbanization reducing support for transit 
through both “price” and “investment” effects.
The second case study is Prop. 23 from 2010. This proposition only gathered 38.4% of the 
vote and would have suspended California’s Global Warming Solutions Act (known as AB 
32) if passed. Here again, suburbanization should affect voting on this proposition, as the 
burden of the regulations that results from AB 32 are borne disproportionately by residents 
with a large carbon footprint—and previous literature has found that suburbanites have 
larger footprints. The results are also consistent with this “price” effect; even though the 
benefits of climate change mitigation are a global public good, suburban voters were more 
likely to support Prop. 23, all else being equal. 
We also find support for the “investment” effect in the 2010 election, as homeownership 
both increases and decreases the probability of voting to suspend AB 32, depending on 
how far the precinct is from the center of the metropolitan area. Consistent with our theory, 
homeownership leads to greater support for climate change mitigation in urban areas, but 
homeownership leads to less support for these efforts in suburban areas. 
We present a third detailed case study mainly for historical comparison; analysis of the 
Passenger Rail And Clean Air Bond Act (Proposition 181 from 1994) indicates some but 
not all of our findings regarding the effect of suburbanization on support for transit are 
robust across multiple issues and time periods. 
In sum, the three case studies generate new knowledge about voter preferences for 
public investment in public transit and environmental regulation. Also, by documenting 
the correlates of support for all transit-related propositions from 1990 to 2010, this study 
serves as a valuable reference for policy makers, concerned citizens and others.
Finally, considering the central role of land value in our theoretical model, we end this report 
with some thoughts on the possibility of using tax increment financing, value capture and 
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other methods to finance public transit infrastructure. Creative financing mechanisms hold 
the promise of increasing the amount of capital available for transit, and also of ensuring 
that scarce transit investment funds are used for the highest-value projects.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
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I. INTRODUCTION
Public transit investment represents a key strategy for revitalizing center cities and reducing 
the harmful effects of driving on the environment. However, enacting transit projects 
often requires approval of the median voter – that is, that at least 50% of the electorate 
plus one, the median voter – vote to approve. However, in the United States and other 
countries, the median voter has been suburbanizing, and few suburbanites rely on public 
transit systems. This study explores the association between suburbanization and political 
support for transit investment. 
There are three broad explanations for why suburban voters may tend to oppose public transit 
investment. First is an access hypothesis. Relative to center city residents, suburbanites 
face a higher time cost of accessing such public transit and thus will be less likely to use it 
and thus gain fewer benefits from its presence. Given that public transit tends to improve 
access to the center city, suburbanites who also work in the suburbs will gain less from 
such infrastructure, and our results document the magnitude of the phenomenon. We 
refer to this as a “price” effect of suburbanization. A second explanation for why urbanites 
are more likely to support transit investment is a capitalization hypothesis. Landowners in 
center cities will enjoy a windfall in land values when new place-based investments are 
made close to their homes. A third hypothesis for explaining differential center city versus 
suburban support for transit projects relates to residential self-selection. If liberals tend 
to live in center cities and to support public projects, while conservatives tend to live in 
suburbs and to oppose high taxes and high cost projects, then we will observe a center 
city/suburban differential even in the absence of the price and investment effects detailed 
above. In the results we present below, we engage in several econometric strategies to 
address this possibility.
Over the last two decades, a large number of important transportation-related ballot 
measures have been voted on in California. A review of all ballot propositions from 1990 to 
present revealed 20 had a significant transportation component. This study uses various 
data sets to investigate the transit priorities that Californians revealed in individual-level 
surveys and in binding voting initiatives. Leveraging both survey and voting data provides 
the opportunity to test the validity of our estimate. If policy makers are basing decisions on 
the results from surveys of public opinion, it is important to know how accurately the survey 
responses predict actual voting. 
Specifically, we test hypotheses concerning the role of household demographics, 
including age, education and race, urban form attributes, including density, centrality and 
homeownership status, ideology, and socio-economic variables, including income and 
unemployment status. 
The analysis of 20 propositions spanning two decades documents important characteristics 
of elections and the electorate. Policy makers can use our results to predict how voters in 
certain precincts are likely to vote on various types of transportation-related propositions. 
This report begins by providing background information, including documenting 
suburbanization trends in the United States and California, reviews related literature, 
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discusses the ballot initiative process in California, and lays out the study’s methodological 
approach. 
Chapter II analyzes three case studies; two recent and one historical: the High-Speed Rail 
proposition (Proposition 1A) from 2008, the Global Warming Solutions Act moratorium 
proposition (Proposition 23) from 2010, and the Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act 
(Proposition 181) from 1994, an important example of a transportation funding attempt 
from an earlier time period.
Suburbanization appears to have reduced support for High-Speed Rail (HSR). HSR 
offers the greatest benefits to urbanites that can more easily access them. Our results 
are consistent with this prediction; in Central Valley areas, homeowners near future HSR 
stations were more likely to vote “yes” on Prop. 1A than homeowners far from future HSR 
stations. We refer to this as an “investment” effect of suburbanization. Our findings are 
thus consistent with increasing suburbanization reducing support for transit through both 
“price” and “investment” effects.
The next case study is Prop. 23 from 2010. This proposition only gathered 38.4% of the 
vote and would have suspended California’s Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32). 
Here again, suburbanization should affect voting on this proposition, as the burden of 
the regulations that results from AB 32 are borne disproportionately by residents with a 
large carbon footprint—and previous literature has found that suburbanites have larger 
footprints.2 The results are consistent with this “price” effect; even though the benefits of 
climate change mitigation are a global public good, suburban voters were more likely to 
support Prop. 23, all else being equal. 
We also find support for the “investment” effect, as homeownership may increase or 
decrease the probability of support for transit environmental policies, depending on how 
far the voting precinct is from downtown. Homeownership leads to greater support for 
climate change mitigation in urban areas, but homeownership leads to less support for 
these efforts in suburban areas. These results are perfectly consistent with predictions 
from urban economic theory regarding how gas taxes and other policies that increase the 
cost of transportation differentially affect urban versus suburban land markets.
We present a third detailed case study mainly for historical comparison; analysis of the 
rail transit bond initiative – Proposition 181 from 1994 – indicates that some but not all of 
our findings are robust across multiple issues and time periods. While we find evidence of 
the price effects of suburbanization that we describe above, results concerning investment 
effects were inconsistent with results from the more recent time periods. In California, the 
early 1990s was an interesting time from a transit funding perspective, and as we discuss 
in the conclusion, should be studied in more detail in future work.
In sum, the three case studies generate new knowledge about voter preferences for 
public investment in public transit and environmental regulation. Also, by documenting the 
correlates of support for all transit-related propositions from 1990 to 2010, this study will 
serve as a valuable reference for future research.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
7
Introduction
Finally, considering the central role of land value in our theoretical model, we end this 
report with some thoughts on the possible role of tax increment financing, value capture 
and other ways of leveraging land markets to finance public transit infrastructure. Creative 
financing mechanisms hold the promise of increasing the amount of capital available for 
transit, and also of ensuring that scarce transit investment funds are used for the highest-
value projects.
The remainder of this Introduction contains five subsections that: document suburbanization 
trends in the United States and California, review related literature, discusses the ballot 
initiative process in California, lay out the study’s central hypotheses, and explain the study’s 
methodological approach. This is followed by the three case studies. Then, we present 
statistical results for all 20 propositions from 1990-2010. The Conclusion summarizes 
the findings, highlights limitations of this study, and discusses the possibility of creatively 
leveraging land markets to generate investment funds for public transit investment.
SUBURBANIZATION TRENDS
In each decade from 1970 to 2010, for the entire United States, we calculate the share 
of metropolitan area residents who live a fixed interval distance from the central business 
district (CBD) (e.g., 0-5 miles, 5-10, 10-15, 15-20, etc.). We use tract-level data from the 
Neighborhood Change database for the 1970-2000 period, and tract-level data from the 
U.S. Census Gazetteer for 2010.3
Figure 1. Suburbanization Trends in the U.S., 1970-2010. Percent of U.S. 
Population Living Less than Five Miles From Downtown
Source: Neighborhood Change Database and 2010 U.S. Census Gazetteer.
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Figure 2. Suburbanization Trends in the U.S., 1970-2010. Percent of U.S. 
Population Living Between 30-35 Miles From Downtown
Source: Neighborhood Change Database and 2010 U.S. Census Gazetteer.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show that more and more metro residents are living far from the city 
center. These two figures highlight what we feel are the most dramatic suburbanization 
trends in our data. The complete set of calculations from which the figures above were 
derived is presented in Table 1. In 1970, 31.6% of the metropolitan population lived within 
five miles of a CBD, while by the year 2010 this percentage had shrunk to 16.9%. In 
contrast, in 1970, 18% of the metropolitan population lived more than 20 miles from the 
CBD. By 2010, this percentage had grown to 39%.
Table 1. Percent of U.S. Population Living at Various Distances (Miles) From 
CBD, 1970-2010
Year
Miles from CBD
0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 >35
1970 31.6 25.6 15.3 9.5 6.3 4.3 2.4 5.0
1980 26.7 23.9 15.7 10.3 7.2 5.1 2.9 8.3
1990 20.3 19.3 13.7 9.2 6.6 4.7 2.9 23.3
2000 18.7 19.2 14.2 9.8 7.0 5.0 3.1 23.0
2010 16.9 18.8 14.6 10.2 7.3 5.2 3.4 23.5
Source: Neighborhood Change Database and 2010 U.S. Census Gazetteer.
We have also repeated the calculations shown above for California’s metropolitan areas. 
There are no major differences to report. California is more urban than the average U.S. 
state, which means the bars in Figure 1 are all higher, however both graphs show similar 
suburbanization trends. 
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Next, using the California year 2000 party registration data from the Statewide Database 
at University of California at Berkeley, we present the share of residents in each of the 
intervals reported in the two figures above who are Democrats and Republicans.
Figure 3. Political Party Membership and Distance From Downtown, 
California Data
Source: SWDB data and authors calculations.
Figure 3 highlights that the conventional wisdom about where Democrats and Republicans 
live in cities is correct. More than 50% of residents who live within five miles of a city center 
are Democrats. This share shrinks monotonically with distance from the city center. In 
contrast, roughly 25% of residents who live within five of a city center are Republicans and 
this share rises monotonically with distance from the city center. Note the percentages of 
Democrats and Republicans do not sum to 100% in the figure as there are a number of 
independent voters and those who register within one of several minor parties.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Our study relates to the literature that studies ballot initiatives to infer public good demand.4 
Several of these studies employ election data from California to study environmental issues. 
Matthew Kahn and John Matsusaka based their estimates on county-level election return 
data, while Kahn’s follow-up studies were an improvement in that they utilized election 
return data at the census tract level. However, none of these studies utilized data from 
elections occurring after 2000, and few of the propositions considered were transit issues. 
Xiaoyu Wu and Bowman Cutter5 followed up on these studies and also analyzed 
environmental and a few transit initiatives from California. By employing block-group level 
data, their analysis employs even more refined geographical data than Kahn. In addition, 
they included estimate models using spatial econometric techniques, which have desirable 
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statistical properties when data suffer from certain problems such as omitted variables. In 
one way, our methodology is identical to theirs, as we followed their method of encoding 
the control variables (discussed below under methodology). We also employ the most 
geographically refined, block-group-level data. However, our approach differs in that we 
focus on transit over environmental initiatives. 
We also go one step further than all of the above-mentioned studies, by analyzing the 
most refined geographical unit possible – namely individual-level survey data. For one 
proposition, Prop. 23 from 2010, we are able to estimate individual-level and precinct-level 
regressions, using the same sets of variables. Erzo Luttmer6 also analyzed both voting 
and survey data, and our approach is complementary to his. 
Although tangential, we draw some insight from the cost-benefit analysis literature that 
has attempted to quantify the bias associated with contingent valuation methods (i.e., 
stated preference survey methods). Some studies found evidence of a bias; Vossler and 
co-authors7 and Schläpfer and co-authors8 found that survey methods tend to overstate 
consumer valuations. However, Schläpfer and Hanley,9 and Robert Johnston10 did not find 
evidence of a bias. One study11 used Field Poll data (which we also employ) and California 
ballot initiative data in an attempt to verify survey findings, with substantial success. 
However, all of these cost-benefit studies attempt to measure environmental goods, and 
we are not aware of studies that have explored transportation goods. 
Transportation scholars have analyzed ballot initiatives before. Work on local transportation 
initiatives includes Werbel and Haas,12 Haas and co-authors,13 Hannay and Wachs,14 and 
Haas.15 Our focus differs from these papers in that we focus on state-level ballot initiatives. 
Also, although some of these studies contain statistical analysis, our approach relies on a 
much more quantitative methodology.
We conclude this discussion of related literature by mentioning a few other studies we 
consulted and found helpful in preparation of this report. Gerber and co-authors16 studied 
state-level ballot initiatives in California, including one of the same propositions we analyze 
(Prop. 116 from 1990). They did not explore the determinants of support for initiatives and 
their focus was rather different from ours.
Recently, several studies of the effect of gas prices on the housing prices have been 
published, and as discussed below in the Hypotheses subsection, our study relates to 
these.17 Whittaker and co-authors18 analyzed the determinants of holding environmentalist 
beliefs, using Field Poll data, over several decades. A major focus in their study was 
on Latino preferences over time. They found that more Latinos, over time, identify as 
environmentalist. We examine the role of ideology at various points throughout this report, 
and this relates closely to the literature that is well summarized in their study.
Finally, three studies we read deal with somewhat similar issues to those that concern us 
here, and also analyze similar data. Wassmer and Lascher19 analyzed survey data from 
the Field Poll. The study by Lewis and Baldassare20 analyzes survey data from the Public 
Policy Institute of California (PPIC), which is another source of survey data for the present 
study. Deacon and Schläpfer studied how spatial variation in public good levels affects 
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voting in a local ballot proposition; in this regard their study is quite similar to our general 
approach.21 
BALLOT MEASURES AND THE BALLOT INITIATIVE PROCESS
Between 1990 and 2010, California’s voters voted on at least 20 ballot propositions related 
to transit provision. In Table 2, we list these propositions, the month and year of the election, 
and the percent voting yes. The names of propositions that passed are italicized.
Nine out of 20 propositions passed. This is a higher rate of passage than reported by 
Gerber and co-authors for all ballot propositions.22
Two broad types of propositions can be identified. The first is termed a Transportation 
Funding Protection proposition; six of this type are in our sample.23 These generally aim 
to prevent the legislature from using gas tax and other sources of revenue (e.g., motor 
vehicle sales tax) for non-transportation expenses. These are popular, as voters approved 
four of the six.24
Table 2. List of Ballot Propositions Studied
Year Month Prop. Name/Description % Yes Vote
2010 Nov 23 Suspends AB 32 until unemployment is below 5.5% for one year 38.4
2010 Nov 22 Transportation Funding Protection 60.7
2008 Nov 1A California High Speed Rail Bond. Senate Bill 1856 52.7
2008 Nov 10 Alternative Fuel Vehicles and Renewable Energy 40.5
2008 Feb 91 Transportation Funding Protection 41.6
2006 Nov 1A Transportation Funding Protection 77.0
2006 Nov 1B Air Quality, and Port Security Bond Act 61.4
2006 Nov 87 Alternative Energy. Tax on California oil producers 45.4
2002 Nov 51 Transportation Protection of Motor Vehicle Sales Tax 42.2
2002 Mar 42 Transportation Congestion Improvement Act 69.1
1998 Nov 2 Transportation Funding Protection 75.4
1998 Nov 7 Air Quality Improvement 43.6
1994 Nov 181 Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1994 34.9
1994 Nov 185 Public Transportation Trust Funds. Gasoline Sales Tax 19.5
1992 Nov 156 Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1992 48.1
1992 Nov 157 Toll Roads and Highways 28.2
1990 Nov 125 Motor Vehicle Tax. Rail Transit Funding 45.6
1990 Jun 108 Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1990 56.3
1990 Jun 111 Traffic Congestion Relief and Spending Limitation Act of 1990 52.4
1990 Jun 116 Rail Transportation. Bond Act 53.3
The second broad type of proposition relates to funding for transportation infrastructure. 
Table 2 contains examples of gas tax proposals (on both consumers and producers) and 
bond measures. Although the conventional wisdom is that voters strongly oppose gas 
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taxes, a review of the record suggests this is not an iron law.25 For example Prop. 111, 
from 1990, imposed gas taxes and truck weight fees, and was approved by 52.4%. True, 
Prop. 125 from 1992 and Prop. 185 from 1994 failed, both of which had similar elements 
to Prop. 111. And Prop. 87 from 2006 also failed, which would have imposed taxes on oil 
producers rather than consumers. However, the success rate for gas tax propositions is 
closer to 25%, rather than 0% that seems to be the conventional wisdom. With regard to 
the other method of financing transit infrastructure, namely bond acts, again we see some 
that pass and some that fail, with about half of bond acts passing.
Finally, there are a few propositions that do not fit neatly into either of these two categories. 
These include Prop. 157 from 1992, Prop. 7 from 1998, Prop. 10 from 2008, and Prop. 23 
from 2010. We will delay discussing the diversity of initiatives further until Chapter III of this 
report. Readers seeking more details about these propositions can turn to the California 
Secretary of State’s Voter Information publications that we reference in Appendix A.
With regard to the institutional details of how propositions appear on ballots, the California 
Secretary of State’s website describes the following five ways a voter in California may 
come to vote on a proposition:26
Legislative Bond Measure
Any bill that calls for the issuance of general obligation bonds must be adopted in each 
house of the Legislature by a two-thirds vote, signed by the Governor, and approved 
by a simple majority of the public’s vote to be enacted. Whenever a bond measure is 
on a statewide ballot, an overview of California’s bond debt is included in the ballot 
pamphlet. 
Legislative Constitutional Amendment
Whenever the Legislature proposes an amendment to the California Constitution, it is 
known as a legislative constitutional amendment. It must be adopted in the Senate and 
the Assembly by a two-thirds vote before it can be placed on the ballot. A legislative 
constitutional amendment does not require the Governor’s signature. This type of 
amendment requires a simple majority of the public’s vote to be enacted. 
Legislative Initiative Amendment
Whenever the Legislature proposes to amend a law that was previously enacted 
through the initiative process, the Legislature is required to present the amendment to 
the voters for passage. The Legislature may amend the previously-adopted initiative 
measure if the measure permits legislative amendment or repeal without voter approval. 
This type of amendment requires a simple majority of the public’s vote to be enacted. 
Initiatives
Often referred to as “direct democracy,” the initiative process is the power of the 
people to place measures on the ballot. These measures can either create or change 
statutes (including general obligation bonds) and amend the California Constitution. 
If the initiative proposes to amend California statute, signatures of registered voters 
gathered must equal in number to 5% of the votes cast for all candidates for Governor 
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in the previous gubernatorial election. If the initiative proposes to amend the California 
Constitution, signatures of registered voters gathered must equal in number to 8% of 
the votes cast for all candidates for Governor in the previous gubernatorial election. An 
initiative requires a simple majority of the public’s vote to be enacted.
Referendum
Referendum is the power of the people to approve or reject statutes adopted by the 
Legislature. However, referenda cannot be used to approve or reject urgency measures 
or statutes that call for elections or provide for tax levies or appropriations for current 
expenses of the state. Voters wishing to block implementation of a legislatively-
adopted statute must gather signatures of registered voters equal in number to 5% of 
the votes cast for all candidates for Governor in the previous gubernatorial election 
within 90 days of enactment of the bill. Once on the ballot, the law is defeated if voters 
cast more NO votes than YES votes on the referendum question.
As mentioned above, for each of the propositions we list in Table 2, we also reproduce detailed 
information from the relevant election’s Voter Information Pamphlet (see Appendix C). Further 
information on propositions can be found on the Web. In addition to these, though covering 
only 2000 to the current period, we also found the Institute of Governmental Studies at the 
University of California, Berkeley to be a useful resource to describe ballot measures.27 
HYPOTHESES
This report’s empirical work sheds light on many aspects of voter support for transit. 
However, we are most interested in testing the following three hypotheses. We first list 
these hypotheses and then discuss some key points.
• Hypothesis 1: Suburbanization, as measured by distance to the CBD, is associated 
with less voter support for transit infrastructure and green transportation policy.
• Hypothesis 2: Urban homeownership is positively associated with voter support for 
transit infrastructure and green transportation policy.
• Hypothesis 3: Suburban homeownership is negatively associated with voter support 
for transit infrastructure and green transportation policy.
One can think of Hypothesis 1 as a “price” hypothesis, and Hypotheses 2 and 3 as 
“investment” hypotheses. The logic behind Hypothesis 1, the price hypothesis, is 
straightforward. Transit infrastructure offers the greatest benefits to urbanites that can 
more easily access them. Suburbanites live farther from the new transit infrastructure 
and thus are less likely to use them. Suburbanites who also work in the suburbs are 
highly unlikely to commute using public transit, as public transit (and HSR) is usually a 
transportation technology that is focused on taking people to downtown locations. The 
basis for Hypothesis 1 is that suburbanites face a higher time price for accessing public 
transit and many of these suburbanites may also not value a transport technology that 
takes them downtown because they shop and work in the suburbs.28 
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Other policies have benefits that do not vary spatially but that have costs that do vary 
spatially. Hypothesis 1 applies in these cases as well. Consider Proposition 23 that was 
defeated in 2010. Climate change mitigation is a global public good, and the benefits of 
this policy do not obviously vary systematically across cities and suburbs. However, the 
costs of the policy do. Households that produce more carbon emissions, either directly 
or indirectly, will face a higher cost of living in general as policies related to AB 32, such 
as carbon pricing, go into effect.29 In previous work, we document that households living 
farther from the city center and live at lower population density, drive more and consume 
more gasoline. Such households are aware that carbon pricing would raise the cost of 
gasoline. 
On a related note, although this report studies direct democracy, the same incentives 
we describe here also affect representative democracy. The political representatives of 
suburban districts tend to oppose carbon mitigation regulation. Work by Cragg and co-
authors30 document that controlling for a Congressional District’s per-capita income and 
the political ideology of the Representative; high per-capita carbon dioxide emissions 
districts feature Congressmen who vote against carbon mitigation legislation (such as the 
2009 Waxman-Markey American Clean Energy and Security (ACES) Act). Thus, spatial 
variation, either in project benefits or policy costs, is key to the causal mechanisms behind 
the “price” hypothesis, which we test using data from California ballot propositions.
Hypothesis 2, the first of the two “investment” hypotheses, relates to William Fischel’s 
landmark 2001 study The Homevoter Hypothesis,31 which describes the powerful 
incentives faced by homeowners to vote, and more generally behave, in ways consistent 
with maximizing the value of their homes. For basically the same reasons outlined above 
for Hypothesis 1 (spatial variation in project benefits or policy costs), property values will 
generally rise in urban neighborhoods as a result of the policies we study.32 For policies 
like AB 32 that increase the cost of driving, the standard “monocentric city” model from 
urban economics shows that higher transportation costs will increase the value of land 
near the center.33
This urban economics model also predicts that higher transportation costs will decrease 
land values farther from the edge of the city, as households become more willing to trade off 
higher rents for shorter commutes. Thus the same set of forces that are behind Hypothesis 
2 are also behind Hypothesis 3. Again, assuming homeowners behave (and vote) in ways 
consistent with maximizing the value of their homes, we predict that homeownership will 
cause suburban voters to be less likely to support carbon pricing. For transit infrastructure 
projects like HSR, it is possible that policy benefits could be so large that all property 
values will rise, even in the suburbs. However, we predict that suburban homeowners will 
perceive that general fund expenditures will need to be curtailed for projects that would 
increase their housing value by more than HSR, or, that their taxes will need to rise to pay 
for the project, and either of these would lead to a fall in their property value. In turn, this 
will cause them to be less likely to support HSR. 
If these hypotheses are true, then given suburbanization patterns in the United States, it 
will become increasingly more difficult – even in liberal states such as California – to gain 
voter support for public transit infrastructure and low carbon policies.
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We next describe the methodology that we employ. We explore the demographic, 
economic, ideological and urban form correlates of voting for transit-related propositions. 
The propositions we analyze are listed in Table 2 above. 
We obtained our data from a variety of sources. The Statewide Database (SWDB) at UC 
Berkeley distributes statement of vote files matched to census blocks for elections between 
1992 and present. Over this time period, we were able to find data for all propositions but 
one (Prop. 42). However, we were able to obtain survey data covering Prop. 42, from 
the Field Poll (produced by the Field Corporation). Thus, we have data on all 16 transit-
focused propositions from 1992 to present. 
Regarding the four propositions from 1990, unfortunately SWDB data do not go back 
this far. However, we do have survey data for three of these propositions, again collected 
by the Field Poll. Thus we are able to present estimate models for all but one of the 20 
transit initiatives that took place between 1990 and 2000, by using voting data for 15, and 
by using survey data for four. For one proposition, Prop. 23 from 2010, we analyze both 
survey and voting data. This survey data was collected by the Public Policy Institute of 
California (PPIC). 
For our analysis of voting data, we merge additional variables to the data supplied by 
SWDB, namely the 1990 Census block group summary file, the 2000 Census block group 
summary file, and the 2006-2010 American Community Survey (ACS) five-year estimates 
(which replaced the decennial census as the primary source for important variables, 
including income and education), again at the block-group level. We match 1992 and 1994 
voting data to the 1990 Census, 1998 and 2002 voting data to the 2000 Census, and 2006, 
2008 and 2010 voting data to the ACS. 
Our survey data, on the other hand, already includes a rich set of demographic and other 
variables. The only additional data we merge with the survey data is the population density 
(population per square mile) of the respondent’s zip code and distance to downtown. 
An important characteristic of our data is its high level of geographical refinement. For most 
of the survey data, we know the respondent’s zip code, and thus have geo-coordinates 
for zip code centroids (technically, these are zip code tabulation areas, or ZCTAs, and this 
data is supplied by the Census Gazetteer). Regarding voting data, we know all block group 
centroids. As we will show, having geographically refined measures is an important part of 
our analysis. 
We study the political divide on transit and related areas like carbon policy using evidence 
from precinct voting and public opinion polls. Possible factors explaining this division 
include: socio-economic (income, unemployment), demographic (age, ethnicity, education), 
political ideology (Republican, Democrat) and residential locational choice. 
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To study the contrast between center city voters and suburban voters over public transit 
voting and carbon pricing, we estimate several versions of equation (1) below:Percent Yesij = β0j + xiβ1j + β2jyi + ziβ3j + εij      (1)
where Percent Yesij refers to the percent of precinct i voting yes on a proposition j. β0j is the 
intercept, or constant, term. Three types of explanatory variables are identified as variable 
types x, y and z: xi is a matrix and represents socioeconomic and demographic variables 
in precinct i and β1j is the coefficient vector on these terms; is a scalar and represents an 
ideological variable in precinct i and β3j is the coefficient on this variable; and zi is a matrix 
of urban form variables in precinct i and β3 is the coefficient vector on these terms. Finally, 
εij is an error term with the usual properties. We will estimate equation (1) using ordinary 
least squares (OLS), controlling for county fixed effects, while weighting the observations 
by the total number of votes in precinct i to mitigate heteroskedasticity concerns.34 We 
estimate equation (1) for each of the 15 propositions for which we have voting data. As 
mentioned above, we were unable to find voting data for 1990 propositions, and any data 
for Prop. 125 from 1990.35
For the three propositions we use in our case studies (Prop. 1A from 2008, Prop. 23 
from 2010 and Prop. 181 from 1994), our approach is to estimate both restricted and 
unrestricted versions of equation (1). In particular, we present our estimates for each data 
set by first restricting β2 and β3 to be zero in order to explore the effect of socioeconomic 
and demographic variables in isolation. We then restrict β1 and β3 to be zero to look at the 
effect of ideology in isolation. Next, we restrict β1 and β2 to be zero to look at the effect of 
urban form in isolation. Finally, we estimate a model where only β2 is restricted to be zero 
(to explore the effect of urban form controlling for demographics), and then a model where 
no coefficient vectors are restricted. Thus, for three of the propositions, we estimate five 
versions of equation (1), which differ only in terms of restrictions. This approach enables 
us to develop a deeper understanding of the relative explanatory power of the variables. 
Finally, we present side-by-side estimates of the unrestricted version of (1) for all 15 
propositions from 1990-2010 for which we have voting data. Comparing coefficient 
estimates across propositions allows us to check whether unmeasured proposition-specific 
variables or other characteristics of the propositions, including financing mechanisms (e.g., 
bond measure, tax increase, etc.), election type (primary versus general), etc., are driving 
any results.
In the cases where we analyze survey data, the model we estimate is very similar to that 
shown in equation (1), but the variables are instead the individual-level counterparts. For 
example, rather than fraction of the precinct with a college degree, we use an indicator of 
whether or not the respondent has a college degree. Also, rather than representing the 
percent of votes in a precinct, the dependent variable is dichotomous, representing either 
preference for or against a proposition. We estimate these models using survey data and 
OLS regression. We have verified the robustness of these linear probability models using 
other estimation strategies including probit and logit. The survey data are weighted using 
the analytical weights provided by the various distributors of the survey data. 
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To be precise, when using survey data we estimate the following model:Vote Yesij = β0j + xiβ1j + β2jyi + ziβ3j + εij      (2)
Where Vote Yesij is a zero or one variable indicating whether or not the respondent i supports 
proposition j. Comparing equations (1) and (2), one can see that we use the same notation 
for the right-hand side variables. However, these variables, while measuring the same 
types of factors, are for the most part not identical to those used with equation (1) for the 
precinct-level data. For example, rather than use the average income in precinct i, we 
use the income reported by respondent i, and so on. The only variables that are identical 
between (1) and (2) are population density of and distance to downtown from respondent i’s zip code.
Our basic approach to testing for an ecological inference problem is straightforward; we 
simply compare the results obtained with both types of data. If the results are similar, then 
we can be more confident that the aggregate voting data is not leading us to make invalid 
inferences. 
One potential weakness of the approach outlined above is that we do not explicitly model 
how heterogeneous households choose where to live within a metropolitan area. Further, 
we recognize that households are not randomly assigned to live in the center city or the 
suburbs. For instance, some people seeking excitement and variety may choose to live 
at a central location while households with school-age children may seek out suburban 
locations. In terms of estimating equation (1) using OLS, we are implicitly assuming 
that controlling for the explanatory variables embodied in the x, y, and z vectors that the 
unobserved determinants of choosing a residential location are uncorrelated with the 
unobserved determinants of voting on the transit measures. 
As discussed in the hypothesis section, we seek to test the “treatment effect”: that distance 
from public transit infrastructure reduces demand for such infrastructure. However, we 
recognize that there is also a potential “selection effect”: that those who would never use 
such a transit option choose to live far from it. In short, people who live in the suburbs may 
vote against transit not because they receive disproportionate net benefits, but because 
they simply dislike transit, and that is one reason they moved to the suburbs in the first 
place.
Our main attempt to address this concern is to include a proxy for the neighborhood’s 
average political ideology, or, with the survey data, a measure of the respondent’s ideology. 
It is plausible that the political ideology is related to preferences for transit, with liberal 
areas or respondents being more likely to be pro-transit and conservative areas being 
more likely to be anti-transit.36 
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II. CALIFORNIA BALLOT INITIATIVES CASE STUDIES
In this chapter, we study three ballot proposition case studies – Prop. 181 from 1994, 
Prop. 1A from 2008, and Prop. 23 from 2010. We include more background information for 
these propositions here and later in the report. To study these propositions more deeply, 
we estimate restricted versions of equation (1), and also explore interactions between 
variables. Once the reader is familiar with the models we estimate for Propositions 185, 
23 and 1A, it will be easier to interpret our results for all propositions that we present in the 
final section before the conclusion.
We lead with a discussion of the 2008 election, in which California voters approved Prop. 
1A, a $9.95 billion high-speed rail (HSR) bond. After examining this proposition in detail, 
we next turn to study Prop. 23 from 2010, in which voters rejected a proposal to suspend 
the State’s climate change mitigation efforts. The final case study we present is Prop. 181 
from 1994. This was the third of three major bond initiatives from the early 1990s that 
would have provided additional funding for rail transit infrastructure. 
Figure 4 displays three maps showing voting results for the three case study propositions, 
at the county level. We see that in all three elections, San Francisco is the most liberal 
county. Also, the coastal counties are more liberal than those of the Central Valley. Finally, 
northern California is more liberal along the coast, but the reverse is true for the Central 
Valley (i.e., northern counties in the Central Valley are more conservative than southern 
counties in the Central Valley). 
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Figure 4. Support for Case Study Propositions, By County
Source: SWDB, University of California, Berkeley.
Clockwise from top left, the maps above show Support for Prop. 181 from 1994, Prop. 
1A from 2008, and Prop. 23 from 2010. In the top two maps, darker shades represent 
pro-transit preferences. In the bottom map, lighter shades represent pro-environmental 
preferences, as a vote yes on Prop. 23 is a vote to suspend environmental regulation. 
PROP. 1A: CALIFORNIA HIGH-SPEED RAIL BOND (2008)
Looking through the language of the propositions we analyze, we find that HSR in 
California has a long history. Of the propositions in our study pool, we first find mention of 
HSR in 1994, where Proposition 185, a voter-initiated initiative, contained two provisions 
for “fast” inter-city rail projects. The first provision of Prop. 185 would have established a 
San Francisco Bay Area-Los Angeles Rail Corridor Joint Powers Agency. From the 1994 
General Election Voter Information pamphlet:37
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The counties of Los Angeles, Monterey, San Benito, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, 
Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, and Ventura shall form the San Francisco Bay Area-Los 
Angeles Rail Corridor Joint Powers Agency for the purposes of acquiring, constructing, 
and operating a fast train intercity, tourist, commuter, and urban rail corridor between 
the San Francisco Bay area and Los Angeles…It shall be the goal of the joint powers 
agency to establish fast train intercity passenger rail service capable of transporting 
passengers between the San Francisco Bay area and Los Angeles in less than six 
hours.
Another provision of Prop. 185 also touched on a different high-speed rail route,38 namely 
in the San Joaquin Valley: 
It shall be the goal of the state to provide high-speed train service, if sufficient funds 
become available, between Los Angeles and the San Francisco Bay Area via the San 
Joaquin Valley by the year 2010. The committee shall determine whether to allocate 
funds pursuant to this paragraph…the timing of the allocation of the funds shall be at 
the discretion of the committee.
Although the HSR proposition did not pass in the 1994 election (we discuss this election 
further in our third case study), the California High-Speed Rail Authority (CaHSRA) existing 
today was established in 1996 through Senate Bill 1420 (SB 1420). From the Legislative 
Counsel’s Digest:39
Existing law provides for the funding and regulation of rail transportation. An existing 
Intercity High-Speed Rail Commission was created in 1993 to conduct studies and to 
prepare a high-speed rail plan for the state.
This bill would create the High-Speed Rail Authority in state government. The bill 
would prescribe the membership of the authority, and provide for the compensation 
of members. The bill would require the authority to direct the development and 
implementation of intercity high-speed rail service that is fully coordinated with other 
public transportation services.
Since its establishment, the CaHSRA has gone through several business plans; the most 
recent was published in 2012.40
In 2008, voters approved Prop. 1A. The voter information pamphlet for that election 
describes the purpose of Prop. 1A (entitled the Safe, Reliable High-Speed Passenger 
Train Bond Act) as:41
To provide Californians a safe, convenient, affordable, and reliable alternative to driving 
and high gas prices; to provide good-paying jobs and improve California’s economy 
while reducing air pollution, global warming greenhouse gases, and our dependence 
on foreign oil, shall $9.95 billion in bonds be issued to establish a clean, efficient high-
speed train service linking Southern California, the Sacramento/San Joaquin Valley, 
and the San Francisco Bay Area, with at least 90% of bond funds spent for specific 
projects, with private and public matching funds required, including, but not limited to, 
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federal funds, funds from revenue bonds, and local funds, and all bond funds subject 
to independent audits? Fiscal Impact: State costs of $19.4 billion, assuming 30 years 
to pay both principal and interest costs of the bonds. Payments would average about 
$647 million per year. When constructed, unknown operation and maintenance costs, 
probably over $1 billion annually; at least partially, and potentially fully, offset by 
passenger fares.
A majority (52.7%) voted yes, meaning that nearly $10 billion in bonds were approved for 
sale to finance development of the HSR project connecting the main population centers 
of the state. 
Figure 5. California High-Speed Rail (HSR) Map
Source: Modified version of image from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Cahsr_map.svg (accessed February 20, 2013).
Figure 5 shows the proposed HSR route. This highlights that this place-based, multi-billion 
dollar investment will have differential effects across California. Previous research has 
examined how Europe’s high-speed rail has impacted economic activity.42 
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Commonly asked questions about HSR in California include: How long will the journey 
take?; How many stations will there be?; and Which sections will be built first? Review 
of the 2008 Voter Information pamphlet provides the following answers: supporters claim 
top speeds of 220 mph, and travel time “from Los Angeles to San Francisco in about 2½ 
hours for about $50 per person.” This document also explains that, “Phase I of the train 
project is the corridor between San Francisco Transbay Terminal and Los Angeles Union 
Station…”43 Thus, an informed voter would know that although the proposition mentions 
HSR connections to Sacramento and San Diego, construction would not begin on these 
sections for some time.44 
Voting Data
Table 3 below contains descriptions for variables used in this and the next case study. The 
methodology section of this report (above) describes our approach to estimating equation (1). 
Recall that the dependent variable is the percent of the block group voting for the proposition, and 
this voting data comes from the SWDB. Data for the remaining variables, with two exceptions, 
are from the 2006-2010 ACS five-year estimates, and these data were downloaded from 
Social Explorer. We provide full details on all data sources in the paragraphs below and in 
Appendix A: Data.
Table 3. Description of Variables Used in Analysis of Census and Voting Data
Variable Name Description
PCT08_1A_Y Percent of block group voting for Prop. 1A (2008)
INC_L_20 Percent of block group with average annual income less than $20,000
INC_20_40 Percent of block group with average annual income between $20,001 and $40,000
INC_40_60 Percent of block group with average annual income between $40,001 and $60,000
INC_75_100 Percent of block group with average annual income between $75,001 and $100,000
INC_100_P Percent of block group with average annual income greater than $100,001 
COLLEGE Percent of block group with college degree or higher
BLACK Percent of block group black
ASIAN Percent of block group asian
OTHER Percent of block group in “other” race category
HISPANIC Percent of block group hispanic
YOUNG Percent of adult population between 18 and 34 years of age
OLD Percent of adult population above 65 years of age
UNEMPLOY Percent of block group unemployed
BUSH Percent of block group voting for George W. Bush in 2004
HOMEOWN Percent of block group that are homeowners
lnDISTANCE Natural log of distance to center of MSA, measured in kilometers
lnDENSITY Natural log of population density of block group, measured as persons per square mile
Notes: MSA: Metropolitan Statistical Area.
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Socio-Economic Variables
For this analysis, our socioeconomic variables include income variables and unemployment 
data. Rather than including a single summary measure of a block group-level income, 
such as average or median income, we follow Wu and Cutter and include five variables, 
measuring the percentage of voters in each group. Considering that Prop. 1A funds rail 
transit, and higher income groups can more easily afford other transportation options, we 
expect income to be negatively correlated with support for Prop. 1A. We also gathered a 
measure of unemployment from census data.45 As supporters of Prop. 1A highlighted, the 
jobs the project would create, we expect unemployment to be positively correlated with 
support for Prop. 1A. 
Demographic Variables
The demographic variables include measures of educational attainment, race and ethnicity, 
and age. Holding income constant, we expect education to be positively correlated with 
support for Prop. 1A. We have less of a solid basis for hypothesizing the relationship 
between the race and ethnicity variables. Finally, all else equal, older voters may depend 
on transit more than younger voters. Of course, it is possible that older voters are more 
fiscally conservative and thus may reject state bond initiatives in general, but keep in mind 
that equation (1) controls for ideology and other variables.
Ideological Variables
To model ideology, we include a measure of the percentage of the block group voting for 
the Republican presidential candidate in the previous election (George W. Bush). The 
2008 election was a presidential election, but we use the percentage of the block group 
voting for George W. Bush in the 2004 election as the control for ideology. Note that this 
ideological variable was predetermined when the 2008 election took place; that is, other 
than the dependent variable, we do not use any other variable from the 2008 election in 
the model. We follow this practice whenever possible throughout this report. We feel it is 
important to use only predetermined independent variables as this enables the results of 
our models to be useful for predicting election results before elections occur.
Urban Form Variables
The final set of variables includes three measures of urban form: distance, density and 
homeownership. These are our main variables of interest. We expect the distance a voter 
lives from downtown, a measure of suburbanization, to be negatively correlated with 
support for Prop. 1A. Rail transit stations tend to be located near downtowns, and so the 
“price” of using transit (in terms of access) is lower for downtown residents. Similarly, rail 
transit access is often easier in denser neighborhoods, and for this reason we expect 
population density to be positively correlated with support for transit. Finally, we include 
homeownership, as suburban areas tend to have high rates of homeownership. 
Specifically, the variable lnDISTANCE was created by merging geocodes into the ACS 
block group data, and then using the 2006 definitions of metropolitan areas, we calculate 
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the distance from each block group to the center of the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) 
in which the block group is located. For block groups that are not in an MSA, we set 
their distance equal to 50 miles (80 kilometers, as programmed in the model), which is 
the distance we have arbitrarily chosen as the urban fringe.46 In all models that use this 
variable, we calculate this as ln(1+distance) (that is, the natural log of one plus the distance 
in kilometers). Similarly, the lnDENSITY (population density) variable is calculated as 
ln(1+density) (that is, natural log of one plus population density at the block group level), 
measured as population by land area, measured in square miles.
We show summary statistics for these data in Table 4. Note that most of the variables have 
a range between zero and one (the exceptions are lnDISTANCE and lnDENSITY). For 
example, the variable INC_L_20 has a mean of 0.15, and this means that in the average 
block group, 15% of the population has income of less than $20,000.
Note the mean of PCT_23_Y and PCT08_1A_Y do not necessarily equal the mean of the 
actual vote, because here the unit of observation is the census block group. 
Table 4. Summary Statistics for Census and Voting Variables, 2006-2010
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
PCT_23_Y 23,126 0.37 0.12 0 1
PCT08_1A_Y 23,134 0.54 0.12 0 1
INC_L_20 23,082 0.15 0.13 0 1
INC_20_40 23,082 0.19 0.12 0 1
INC_40_60 23,082 0.16 0.09 0 1
INC_75_100 23,082 0.13 0.08 0 1
INC_100_P 23,082 0.27 0.20 0 1
COLLEGE 23,118 0.30 0.21 0 1
BLACK 23,123 0.06 0.12 0 1
ASIAN 23,123 0.12 0.16 0 1
OTHER 23,123 0.19 0.16 0 1
HISPANIC 23,123 0.34 0.28 0 1
YOUNG 23,123 0.32 0.14 0 1
OLD 23,123 0.16 0.11 0 1
UNEMPLOY 23,093 0.09 0.07 0 1
BUSH 23,110 0.41 0.19 0 1
HOMEOWN 23,082 0.59 0.28 0 1
lnDISTANCE 23,211 3.00 0.88 0.02 4.39
lnDENSITY 23,189 8.38 1.70 0.00 12.33
Table 5 contains the results of estimating a restricted version of equation (1). Here, the 
coefficients on the urban form and ideology variables are restricted to be zero, so that we 
can focus on the effect of socio-economic and demographic variables. Note that in this 
model, as in all of the models we analyze in this report that utilize voting data, we include 
county fixed effects and the variables are weighted by the total number of votes in the 
census block group.
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Table 5. OLS Regression; Prop. 1A (2008) Voting Data, Socio-Economic and 
Demographic-Only Restriction
Variable 
Estimated Coefficients by OLS on Dependent Variable 
“Percent Voting Yes on Prop. 1A” PCT08_1A_Y
INC_L_20 0.136***
(0.0075)
INC_20_40 0.0638***
(0.0079)
INC_40_60 0.0352***
(0.0084)
INC_75_100 -0.0499***
(0.0086)
INC_100_P -0.136***
(0.0070)
COLLEGE 0.247***
(0.0036)
BLACK 0.203***
(0.0043)
ASIAN 0.0748***
(0.0031)
OTHER 0.0210***
(0.0048)
HISPANIC 0.143***
(0.0034)
YOUNG 0.109***
(0.0046)
OLD -0.0373***
(0.0052)
UNEMPLOY 0.00198
(0.0078)
Constant 0.448***
(0.0070)
Observations 23,056
R-squared 0.719
County fixed 
effects?
Yes
Notes: Standard error is listed in parentheses. 
p-values are denoted by:  
*** p<0.01 
** p<0.05 
* p<0.10
What do these results tell us about the role of socio-economic variables on support for 
HSR? Consider first the coefficients on the income variables. The coefficient on the 
lowest income variable is 0.136, indicating that precincts with a higher share of lower 
income residents tend to vote in favor of the bill. This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
lower income residents will support high-speed rail because they are disproportionately 
familiar with using public transit. The coefficient on the highest income variable is -0.136 
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(coincidentally the same in absolute value as the above mentioned estimated coefficient 
to three decimal places). This indicates that precincts with many high income voters voted 
disproportionately against Prop. 1A. Moving from the coefficient on the lowest income 
group to the coefficient on the highest income group, the estimate drops in a step-wise 
fashion from 0.136, to 0.0638, to 0.0352, and so on, indicating that the likelihood of 
supporting Prop. 1A falls with income. Note that one income category is excluded from this 
regression, the $60,000 to $75,000 category. This is a technical requirement, as otherwise 
the sum of the income variables would equal one for each observation, and this will lead 
to perfect multicollinearity, a violation of the requirements of OLS.
The other major socio-economic variable included in the table above is unemployment. A 
reasonable hypothesis is that precincts with more unemployed voters voted for high-speed 
rail, as the project was presented as having stimulus potential. The estimated coefficient 
on UNEMPLOY, 0.00198, is very small, and is not statistically different from zero. We 
will have more to say about unemployment later in this section, but this finding indicates 
that support for high-speed rail does not depend on unemployed voters, as is commonly 
thought.
Turning to demographic variables, we consider educational attainment, race and ethnicity, and 
age. Precincts in which many of the voters have college degrees are more likely to vote for 
Prop. 1A. To illustrate, the findings indicate that a precinct that is one standard deviation above 
the mean in terms of college graduates is 5% more likely to vote for Prop. 1A. To calculate this 
percentage, we use (from Table 4) the standard deviation for variable COLLEGE (0.21) and 
multiply this by (from Table 5) the coefficient on COLLEGE (0.247). The result is 0.0504, or 
approximately 5%.
With regard to race and ethnicity, we exclude the White/Caucasian category. Note that the 
coefficient estimates on other ethnic groups is positive. This means that, for example, if a 
precinct goes from being 25% White and 25% Hispanic (with the remaining some mix of 
the other ethnicities) to 20% White and 30% Hispanic, the probability of voting for Prop. 1A 
increases by 0.007 (or just over 0.5%). 
Finally, we see that younger voters are more likely to support Prop. 1A, as the coefficient 
on YOUNG is 0.109, while the coefficient on OLD is -0.373. The category for middle-aged 
voters is excluded. The estimates on YOUNG and OLD indicate that as the fraction of the 
precinct’s voter age increases toward the OLD category, support for high-speed rail falls. 
What do these findings mean for the future of support for HSR? We believe that for many 
questions, our results are informative. For example, the state of the economy during a 
future election where some aspect of the HSR project is being decided may not have as 
large an effect as is commonly believed, as unemployment is not significant. As average 
income continues to grow in the United States, support for HSR may decrease, although 
as California adds more residents from other states and immigrants from other countries, 
many of whom may be low-income, then support for HSR will increase. Thus, the effect of 
income depends on how the population changes. In addition, as the population becomes 
more educated, our results suggest that support for HSR will increase, but if we add 
population that is not college educated, support for HSR will decrease. 
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Similarly, it is not perfectly clear how these results translate into predictions regarding the 
role of age. As the population ages, it is possible that these aging voters will turn against 
HSR. However, these results are also consistent with a world where, as the population 
ages, the oldest voters are replaced by the middle-aged. The current middle-aged voters 
are less opposed to HSR than the current old voters, and so as the former replaces the 
latter, support for HSR may increase.
The preceding paragraphs illustrate how the estimates of our model can be used to inform 
policy, both by suggesting what various types of voters demand in terms of HSR, and also 
in predicting how demographic and socio-economic changes will shift support for HSR in 
future elections. 
Next, we look at ideology and urban form. To examine ideology and urban form, we present 
the results shown in Table 6.
Table 6. Restricted and Unrestricted OLS Regressions; Prop. 1A (2008) Voting Data
Estimated Coefficients by OLS on Dependent Variable 
“Percent Voting Yes on Prop. 1A”
PCT08_1A_Y
Variable
Socio-economic, 
Demographic
Only
Ideology 
Only
Urban Form 
Only
All But  
Ideology Unrestricted
UNEMPLOY 0.00198 0.0251*** 0.0135***
(0.0078) (0.0072) (0.0051)
BUSH -0.549*** -0.457***
(0.0023) (0.0030)
HOMEOWN -0.135*** -0.0646*** -0.0459***
(0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0018)
lnDISTANCE -0.0407*** -0.0312*** -0.0077***
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0004)
lnDENSITY 0.0099*** 0.0068*** 0.0026***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Constant 0.448*** 0.756*** 0.758*** 0.581*** 0.709***
(0.0070) (0.0015) (0.0051) (0.0078) (0.0057)
Observations 23,050 23,078 23,055 23,050 23,025 
R-squared 0.719 0.854 0.708 0.766 0.882
County fixed 
effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic/ 
SE controls? Yes No No Yes Yes
Notes: Standard error is listed in parentheses. 
p-values are denoted by:  
*** p<0.01 
** p<0.05 
* p<0.10
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Table 6 reports five estimates of equation (1). The information in data column 1 contains 
the same information reported in Table 5 (the model restricted to socio-economic and 
demographic variables). It is reproduced here so that the coefficient on UNEMPLOY can be 
compared across other specifications, and also so that the R-squared from the specification 
in Table 5 can be easily compared with others. Table 6 displays a subset of coefficients 
on all demographic and socio-economic variables. A complete set of coefficients for the 
unrestricted model are displayed in Table 23. Those readers interested in the effect of 
these variables on voting should consult Table 23 as well as Table 5. 
Column 2 of Table 6 shows that the variable BUSH is a strong predictor of voting against 
Prop. 1A. Including county fixed effects but no additional variables, we see that the 
variable BUSH explains 85% of the variation in voting preference for Prop. 1A (i.e., the 
R-squared is 0.854). As the R-squared is a number between zero and one, this indicates 
a very high degree of explanatory power. Indeed, one single variable—BUSH—explains 
more than do all of the socio-economic and demographic variables combined, as can 
be seen by comparing the R-squared of 0.854 in column 2 to the value from column 1 
of 0.719.47 Note that the negative coefficient on BUSH of -0.549 indicates that precincts 
with more Republican voters tended to vote against Prop. 1A, and this is consistent with 
our expectation that conservative voters are opposed to government transit infrastructure 
projects.
Column 3 illustrates the effects of urban form. The R-squared of 0.708 indicates that three 
urban form variables – lnDISTANCE, lnDENSITY and HOMEOWN – together explain nearly 
as much as do all of the socio-economic and demographic variables. In addition to having 
considerable explanatory power, the signs and magnitudes of these coefficients tell an 
interesting story about how urban form influences voting. In general, more suburban locations 
voted against Prop. 1A. This is consistent with our expectations, as suburban voters have 
easy access to automobile infrastructure, are higher income, and so can afford high-quality 
cars, and are also farther from transit locations. We see this with a positive coefficient on 
population density (denser areas were more likely to vote in favor of Prop. 1A), and negative 
coefficients on distance and homeownership (precincts far from the city center were more 
likely to vote against the HSR proposition, as were precincts with many homeowners).
The model shown in column 4 includes the urban form variables as well as the demographic 
and socio-economic variables. Note of these latter variables, only UNEMPLOY is shown 
(the others being repressed to conserve on space). In this specification, the R-squared 
value increases to 0.766, still lower than the ideology-only specification, but a statistically 
significant increase from the specifications in both columns 1 and 3. Note also that the 
urban form variables all decrease in magnitude, when comparing the results from column 
3 with those from column 4. This is especially true for HOMEOWN, which decreases by 
more than half. The coefficients on lnDISTANCE and lnDENSITY also decrease, but by 
less than half.
On the other hand, the coefficient on UNEMPLOY in column 4 increases, compared with 
the results presented in column 1. The coefficient on UNEMPLOY of 0.0251 indicates that 
a district that is one standard deviation above the mean has a 0.07 × 0.0251 = 0.0018 
higher probability of voting for Prop. 1A, or 0.18%; this is approximately two-tenths of one 
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percent. Thus, although the coefficient on UNEMPLOY is now statistically significant, the 
effect of unemployment is still not large.
The final specification reported in column 5 of Table 6 is the unrestricted version of the 
model presented in equation (1), as it includes all of the independent variables. Compared 
to column 4, this specification controls for ideology. We see that the coefficients on the 
urban form variables decrease in magnitude even further when compared to the other 
versions. The coefficient on UNEMPLOY also decreases in magnitude but retains statistical 
significance (meaning we can reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on UNEMPLOY is 
precisely zero, though it is still very small in magnitude). 
The R-squared value in column 5 is 0.882. This suggests that although the ideology variable 
explains a lot of the variation in voting for Prop. 1A, the socio-economic, demographic and 
urban form variables also contribute explanatory power.
In the remainder of this section, we use the same basic approach as above to delve 
deeper into several questions relating to our distance, homeownership and unemployment 
variables, and we explore whether voting patterns in California’s Central Valley differ 
systematically from voting patterns in the rest of the state. 
A Closer Look at Prop. 1A and the Role of Distance
The variable lnDISTANCE used in the models in Table 6 is calculated as the distance from 
the center of each block group to center of the downtown of the MSA in which the block 
group is a part. Urban economic theory suggests the distance a household lives from 
downtown is important. In many cases, the downtown of the MSA will coincide closely 
with the location of the HSR station – for example (refer to Figure 5), in each of the cases 
of San Francisco, San Jose and Los Angeles, the location used as the downtown of the 
MSA is within one mile of the proposed HSR station. However, in other cases, for example 
Chico, California, the closest HSR station will be Sacramento. Residents of downtown 
Chico will have a low value of lnDISTANCE (distance from downtown), but the distance to 
the nearest HSR station will be long. 
Given the nature of Prop. 1A, we are interested in testing whether distance to HSR station 
predicts voting for Prop. 1A. We calculate a variable we term lnHSRdist, which is the 
natural log of the distance from a block group to the nearest HSR station.48 
We re-estimate the unrestricted version of the model using lnHSRdist in place of 
lnDISTANCE. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that distance to the center of MSA has a 
larger influence on voting for Prop. 1A than does distance to the nearest HSR station, in 
the sense that the coefficient estimate is larger in the lnDISTANCE case. The coefficient 
on lnHSRdist is 0.003, compared to 0.009 for lnDISTANCE. When including both variables 
in the model, only lnDISTANCE is significant.
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A Closer Look at Prop. 1A and Homeownership
Next, we test the hypothesis that land values rise near areas where an HSR station is to 
be located. We create an interaction variable, INTERACT_HSRdist, where: 
INTERACT_HSRdist = lnHSRdist × HOMEOWN 
Then, we estimate a new model which his identical to the unrestricted version of equation 
(1) but that also includes this interaction variable.
Our hypothesis is that homeowners near stations will be more likely to vote for Prop. 1A, 
as they estimate the value of their home will increase as a result of having easier access 
to the state’s major population centers. On the other hand, homeowners far from stations 
will vote against Prop. 1A, as their access to HSR will be more limited, although their tax 
dollars will still be used to repay the bonds used to finance the project.49
However, and again to our surprise, we find the coefficient on HOMEOWN is smaller, i.e. 
more negative (-0.059), and the coefficient on the interaction variable is positive (0.0043). 
The coefficient on HOMEOWN is not significant, and while the interaction variable is 
significant at the 1% level, the coefficient is small (at 0.0043). Thus, there appears to be 
little economic significance of the interaction between HOMEOWN and lnHSRdist when 
looking across block groups in California. 
A Closer Look at Prop. 1A in the Central Valley
The final modification estimates the same interaction model from above, but here we 
include only households from Central Valley counties. There are several reasons why we 
think voting patterns in California’s Central Valley might differ systematically from voting 
patterns in the rest of the state. 
First, as discussed above, construction was widely known to be planned to occur between 
San Francisco and Los Angeles in the first phase, so Central Valley voters would have 
assumed construction would begin relatively soon. Given the higher unemployment in the 
Central Valley, it would not have been unreasonable for them to assume that construction 
might even start in these counties, as is now planned.50 The Central Valley is less urban 
and more agricultural, and the political landscape is more conservative. However, key to 
the urban economic theory underlying our analysis is that, by providing fast connections 
from the Central Valley to the two main population centers of the state, Central Valley real 
estate, particularly properties near HSR stations, becomes more attractive. Therefore, 
although our interaction approach, described above, does not reveal a large effect across 
the state, we think it will in the Central Valley.51
Second, we examine whether unemployment was a bigger factor among voters in 
California’s Central Valley in the Prop. 1A vote. Unemployment in the Central Valley is 
higher than in the rest of the state (12.2% versus 8.8% in our sample) and significant 
construction would take place first in this region.
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Table 7. OLS Regression with Homeowner-Distance Interactions in the Central 
Valley; Prop. 1A (2008) and Capitalization
Variable
Estimated Coefficients by OLS on Dependent Variable 
“Percent Voting Yes on Prop. 1A”
PCT08_1A_Y
UNEMPLOY 0.0296*
(0.02)
BUSH -0.343***
(0.01)
HOMEOWN 0.0363**
(0.02)
lnHSRdist -0.00813**
(0.00)
lnDENSITY 0.00882***
(0.00)
INTERACT_HSRdist -0.0191***
(0.01)
Constant 0.624***
(0.02)
Observations 1,645
R-squared 0.77
Demographic/SE and ideological controls? Yes
County fixed effects? Yes
Notes: Standard error is listed in parentheses. 
p-values are denoted by:  
*** p<0.01 
** p<0.05 
* p<0.10
As one can see in Table 7, the coefficient on UNEMPLOY is about twice the value of that 
estimated in the unrestricted, state-wide model (0.0135, from Table 6), but not statistically 
significant, at the 5% level. This does not clearly suggest whether or not unemployment 
has a differential effect in the Central Valley. 
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Figure 6. Marginal Effect Of Homeownership on Voting for Prop. 1A, By Distance 
to HSR Station, Central Valley Counties Only
Notes: Marginal effect is calculated as 0.0363-(0.0191× lnHSRdist), units reflect change in predicted probability of voting 
yes due to change in homeownership rate.
With respect to distance and homeownership both INTERACT_HSRdist and HOMEOWN 
are statistically significant at the 5% level or better. The coefficient on HOMEOWN is 
0.0363, while the coefficient on INTERACT_HSRdist is -0.0191. Note that because we are 
including the interaction term, the marginal effect of HOMEOWN on voting for Prop. 1A now 
depends on the value of lnHSRdist. Specifically, dy/dx is 0.0363-(0.0191×lnHSRdist). The 
resulting curve is shown in Figure 6. These results suggest that homeowners nearer HSR 
stations are more likely to vote for Prop. 1A, while homeowners farther from HSR stations 
are more likely to vote against. The cutoff value occurs where lnHSRdist = .0363/.0191 = 
1.90, or 4.2 miles; homeowners closer to HSR stations are predicted to support Prop. 1A 
while homeonwers farther away are predicted to oppose Prop. 1A. 
Thus, the result of this final hypothesis test, where we analyze only the Central Valley 
subsample, is consistent with our expectations. 
PROP. 23: SUSPEND AB 32 – THE GLOBAL WARMING SOLUTIONS ACT 
(2010)
Prop. 23, had it been approved by voters, would have placed a moratorium on the largest 
aspect of California’s aggressive climate change mitigation efforts. Assembly Bill 32 (AB 
32) was signed into law in 2006 by Governor Schwarzenegger, and is a landmark piece of 
environmental regulation. Thus, to understand Prop. 23, one must begin by understanding 
AB 32. 
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The Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, also known as AB 32, is a California state law 
that requires greenhouse gas emissions from all sources throughout the state be reduced 
to year 1990 levels by year 2020. This represents emissions reductions of about 25%.52 
According to economist Michael Hanemann, “AB 32 is noteworthy because it legislates 
a more comprehensive and stringent control on GHG [Greenhouse Gas] emissions than 
exists in any other state.”53 The California Air Resources Board (CARB) is charged with 
developing regulations and market mechanisms to ensure GHG reduction goals are met 
by 2020.54 
Prop. 23 would have suspended AB 32 until the unemployment rate fell to 5.5% for one 
full year. The specific language voters saw, taken from the 2010 Voter Information Guide 
was:55
PROP 23: Suspends implementation of air pollution control law (AB 32) requiring 
major sources of emissions to report and reduce greenhouse gas emissions that 
cause global warming, until unemployment drops to 5.5 percent or less for full year. 
Fiscal Impact: Likely modest net increase in overall economic activity in the state 
from suspension of greenhouse gases regulatory activity, resulting in a potentially 
significant net increase in state and local revenues.
The passing of AB 32 opened the door to a variety of types of regulations and market 
mechanisms targeting GHG emissions. The largest policy in CARB’s toolbox is the cap 
and trade system, which in 2013 went into effect for electric utilities and large industrial 
facilities, and in 2015, is scheduled to go into effect for distributors of transportation, natural 
gas and other fuels. 
In addition to the cap and trade system, CARB is responsible for overseeing numerous 
regulations, including a first in the country GHG emissions standards for light duty vehicles, 
subsequently adopted by other states and the federal government.56 Other regulations are 
smaller scale, such as the requirement that automotive service providers check a vehicle’s 
tire pressure when performing maintenance or repair service. California gas stations are 
also required to provide free compressed air when customers purchase fuel.57 Taken 
together, we envision that voters with a large carbon footprint would be opposed to AB 32 
(and would thus be more likely to vote yes on Prop. 23) as they see the burden of these 
regulations falling disproportionately on them.
Prop. 23 is a transit-related proposition because so many of the policies bundled into AB 32 
are intended to change transportation patterns to encourage a more fuel efficient vehicle 
fleet and to raise the price of fossil fuels to reflect the negative externalities associated 
with their consumption.58 Although the word “transit” does not appear anywhere in the text 
of the proposition, Prop. 23, in the United States, the transportation sector accounts for 
70% of oil consumption and 30% of GHG emissions.59 Another example of how Prop. 23 
is a transit proposition is that some of the revenues from the cap and trade system set up 
by CARB pursuant to AB 32 are likely going to be used to finance the HSR project. Thus, 
understanding how voters feel about Prop. 23 is crucial for understanding the future of 
transit in California and the United States. 
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Survey Data
We begin by discussing the survey data we analyze for Prop. 23. The data were collected 
by the Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) in July 2010. Later in this section we 
analyze voting data for the same proposition; the use of voting data and survey data to 
estimate equations (1) and (2) sheds light on whether the results obtained with survey or 
voting are subject to any sort of bias.
This PPIC survey asked about opinions towards global warming in general and AB 32 in 
particular, although it did not specifically name Proposition 23. One important characteristic 
of these data for our purposes is the availability of zip code identifiers for respondents, thus 
allowing us to calculate fairly refined measures of distance to downtown and neighborhood 
population density.60
As mentioned, the survey did not ask about Prop. 23, specifically. However, question topics 
do relate closely to the issues covered by the proposition, and thus we should be able to 
predict how a respondent would vote on Prop. 23 based on their answers to the PPIC 
survey questions. In particular, a “favor” (i.e., in favor of) answer to Q19 below suggests 
that the respondent would vote “no” on Prop. 23. Even more strongly, a “wait until state 
economy and job situation improve” answer to Q21 below suggests the respondent would 
vote “yes” on Prop. 23. This is because even if someone agrees with AB 32 in principle, it 
is possible they would agree to wait to enforce it.
The survey asked the following five questions that relate to Prop. 23 (response options in 
parentheses):
• Q18. How serious of a threat is global warming to the economy and quality of life 
for California’s future—do you think that it is a very serious, somewhat serious, not 
too serious, or not at all serious of a threat? (very serious, somewhat serious, not 
too serious, not at all serious)
• Q19. Next, to address global warming, do you favor or oppose the state law that 
requires California to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions back to 1990 levels by 
the year 2020? (favor, oppose) 
• Q20. Do you favor or oppose the California state government making its own 
policies, separate from the federal government, to address the issue of global 
warming? (favor, oppose) 
• Q21. When it comes to the state government’s plans for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions, should it [ROTATE] [1] take action right away [OR SHOULD IT] [2] wait 
until the state economy and job situation improve to take action? (favor, oppose) 
• Q22. Do you think the government should or should not regulate the release of 
greenhouse gases from sources like power plants, cars, and factories in an effort to 
reduce global warming? (should, should not)
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Our analysis contains similar explanatory variables to those we use in the analysis of Prop. 
1A, except the variables relate to individuals rather than block groups All of these variables 
are contained in the PPIC survey data, except for two. As mentioned, the PPIC survey 
provides zip code identifiers for respondents, and we use these to calculate population 
density at the zip code tabulation area (ZCTA) level. Similarly, we calculate the distance 
from the center of each respondent’s ZCTA to the downtown of the MSA in which that 
respondent lives. Descriptions of all variables are presented in Table 8.
Table 8. Description of Variables Used in Analysis of PPIC Survey Data
Variable* Description
NOT_SERIOUS_THREAT Respondent believes global warming is not a threat
OPPOSE_AB32 Respondent opposes AB 32
OPPOSE_CA_ACTION Respondent opposes state action on global warming
AGREE_WAIT Respondent believe state should wait until economy improves before reducing 
GHG emissions
OPPOSE_REGULATE Respondent opposes regulating GHG emissions
PROP23INDEX The sum of the first five variables listed in this table
INC_L_20 Respondent’s income is less than $20,000
INC_20_40 Respondent’s income is between $20,000-$40,000
INC_40_60 Respondent’s income is between $40,000-$60,000
INC_80_100 Respondent’s income is between $80,000-$100,000
INC_100_P Respondent’s income is greater than $100,000
COLLEGE Respondent has college degree or higher
BLACK Respondent answered “Black” to race and ethnicity question
ASIAN Respondent answered “Asian” to race and ethnicity question
OTHER Respondent answered “Other” to race and ethnicity question
HISPANIC Respondent answered “Hispanic” to race and ethnicity question
YOUNG Respondent’s age is between 18 and 34 years
OLD Respondent’s age is 65 years or older
UNEMPLOY Respondent is unemployed
REP Respondent is registered as a Republican
lnDISTANCE Natural log of distance in kilometers from respondent’s household to CBD
lnZIPDEN Natural log of population density (persons per sq. mi.) in respondent’s zip code 
HOMEOWNER Respondent owns home
Note: *All of the variables are indicator (zero or one) variables, except for PROP23INDEX, lnDISTANCE and 
lnDENSITY.
In short, based on the five questions reproduced above, we have five measures that 
indicate how each respondent would vote on Prop. 23. To conserve space, we combine 
these variables into a summary measure which we title PROP23INDEX and use this as 
the dependent variable in the analyses below.61 The variable PROP23INDEX is the sum 
of the first five variables listed in Table 8. We also define a number of socio-economic, 
demographic, ideological and urban form variables. And, we have data on all the variables 
that are required to estimate equation (2). We also analyze responses to each of the five 
questions separately. These results can be found in Appendix B.
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Table 9 contains a correlation matrix for the five Prop. 23 questions listed above, as well as 
the summary PROP23INDEX measure. As one can see, the correlation between the index 
variable and the individual responses ranges from approximately 0.65 to 0.79. Table 9 
also reveals that, although the five Prop. 23 measures are related to each other, they also 
emphasize different aspects of attitudes towards the policy. The correlation between the 
five raw questions ranges from 0.56 (between NOT_SERIOUS_THREAT and OPPOSE_
AB32) to a low of 0.26 (between OPPOSE_CA_ACTION and AGREE_WAIT). 
Table 9. Correlation Between Measures of Support for Climate Change Policy, 
PPIC Survey Data
 
PROP23 
INDEX
NOT_SERIOUS_
THREAT
OPPOSE_
AB32
OPPOSE_CA_ 
ACTION
AGREE_
WAIT
OPPOSE_
REGULATE
PROP23INDEX 1
NOT_SERIOUS_THREAT 0.78 1
OPPOSE_AB32 0.79 0.56 1
OPPOSE_CA_ACTION 0.65 0.34 0.41 1
AGREE_WAIT 0.72 0.52 0.42 0.26 1
OPPOSE_REGULATE 0.75 0.54 0.54 0.34 0.41 1
Table 10 contains summary statistics for the complete set of variables. The mean value of 
PROP23INDEX is 1.65, which means that the average respondent indicated support for 
Prop. 23 through his responses to nearly two of the core questions listed above. Looking 
at the individual questions, 44% of respondents agreed that California should wait until the 
economy improves before reducing GHG emissions, and this was the question in which 
the most anti-mitigation sentiments were expressed. This figure is also fairly close to the 
38.4% of voters that ultimately supported Prop. 23. 
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Table 10. Summary Statistics, 2010 PPIC Survey Data
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
PROP23INDEX 2,183 1.65 1.53 0 5
NOT_SERIOUS_THREAT 2,183 0.3 0.35 0 1
OPPOSE_AB32 2,183 0.28 0.42 0 1
OPPOSE_CA_ACTION 2,183 0.38 0.47 0 1
AGREE_WAIT 2,183 0.44 0.48 0 1
OPPOSE_REGULATE 2,183 0.22 0.40 0 1
INC_L_20 2,063 0.19 0.39 0 1
INC_20_40 2,063 0.20 0.40 0 1
INC_40_60 2,063 0.15 0.36 0 1
INC_80_100 2,063 0.11 0.31 0 1
INC_100_P 2,063 0.24 0.43 0 1
COLLEGE 2,183 0.42 0.49 0 1
BLACK 2,183 0.21 0.41 0 1
ASIAN 2,183 0.12 0.33 0 1
OTHER 2,183 0.17 0.37 0 1
HISPANIC 2,183 0.24 0.43 0 1
YOUNG 2,183 0.33 0.47 0 1
OLD 2,183 0.13 0.34 0 1
UNEMPLOY 2,183 0.07 0.26 0 1
REP 2,183 0.25 0.43 0 1
lnDISTANCE 2,183 2.99 0.88 -1.56 4.60
lnZIPDEN 2,168 7.99 1.48 1.58 10.89
HOMEOWNER 2,055 0.61 0.49 0 1
Source: For all variables except lnDISTANCE and lnZIPDEN: Public Policy Institute of California, Statewide Survey, 
July 2010, “Californians and the Environment.” The source for lnDISTANCE and lnZIPDEN are author’s calculations, 
based on U.S. Census figures.
The first set of regression results using the survey data focuses on demographic and 
socio-economic variables, and these are shown in Table 11. (We emphasize that these 
models are not linear probability models as the dependent variable ranges from zero to 
five, and caution must be taken when comparing these results to those from the analysis of 
the voting data, a comparison we make Table 16.) We begin by describing the estimates of 
the coefficients on the socio-economic variables. The coefficients on the income variables 
show that support is highest among the excluded income category (INC_60_80); being in 
any other income category lowers support for Prop. 23 relative to the excluded category. 
Although the two highest income categories are less likely to favor Prop. 23 (as measured 
by the PROP23INDEX variable) than the excluded category, by far, the two lowest income 
categories most strongly oppose Prop. 23. This is to say, we find a non-linear relationship 
between support for Prop. 23 and income level, with both low-income and high-income 
groups opposed, but the low-income groups more strongly opposed. However, only the 
coefficients on the two lowest income groups are statistically significant.
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The coefficient on unemployment is negative but not statistically significant. One would 
expect a positive and significant coefficient on unemployment, as Prop. 23 had a strong 
employment aspect to it.
In Appendix B, we present results where we analyze linear probability models that use 
each of the five individual questions as dependent variables. In these models, we would 
expect unemployment to be most strongly related to the AGREE_WAIT question. We, 
indeed, do find this to be the case. However, even in this model, the coefficient estimate 
on UNEMPLOY is not statistically distinguishable from zero.
Turning to demographics, we again include age, education and race/ethnicity variables. 
Young voters tend to oppose Prop. 23, while older voters tend to support it. These 
estimates are highly significant. On the other hand, although more educated voters (those 
with a college degree) tend to oppose Prop. 23, as shown by the negative coefficient on 
COLLEGE of -0.0969, this coefficient is not statistically different from zero. Finally, we 
do not find a strong relationship among the race and ethnicity variables with respect to 
potential Prop. 23 vote preference. With the exception of the OTHER variable (which is 
the catchall category for a respondent not fitting into one of the named race or ethnicity 
categories), none of the coefficients is statistically significant. 
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Table 11. OLS Regression, Prop. 23, 2010 Survey Data, Socio-Economic and 
Demographic-Only Restriction
Variable
Estimated Coefficients by OLS on Dependent Variable 
“Index of Support for Prop. 23”
PROP23INDEX
INC_L_20 -0.520***
(0.1290)
INC_20_40 -0.560***
(0.1220)
INC_40_60 -0.129
(0.1260)
INC_80_100 -0.0383
(0.1370)
INC_100_P -0.0992
(0.1190)
COLLEGE -0.0969
(0.6570)
BLACK 0.0659
(0.6630)
ASIAN -0.517
(0.6670)
OTHER -0.290***
(0.1040)
HISPANIC 0.219
(0.6630)
YOUNG -0.340***
(0.0765)
OLD 0.419***
(0.1030)
UNEMPLOY -0.0968
(0.1300)
Constant 1.708**
(0.6890)
Observations 2,063
R-squared 0.134
Adjusted R-squared 0.112
County fixed effects? Yes
Notes: Standard error is listed in parentheses. 
p-values are denoted by:  
*** p<0.01 
** p<0.05 
* p<0.10
We next turn to the regression results using the survey data that focus on ideology and 
urban form. These are presented in Table 12.
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Table 12. Restricted and Unrestricted OLS Regression; Prop. 23, 2010 Survey Data
Estimated Coefficients by OLS on Dependent Variable 
PROP23INDEX
Variable
Socio-economic, 
Demographic
Only
Ideology 
Only
Urban Form 
Only
All But  
Ideology Unrestricted
UNEMPLOY -0.0968 -0.0682 0.0116
(0.1300) (0.1390) (0.1290)
REP 1.513*** 1.352***
(0.0687) (0.0779)
lnDISTANCE 0.0756 0.087 0.0276
(0.0589) (0.0593) (0.0551)
lnZIPDEN -0.125*** -0.106*** -0.0867**
(0.0379) (0.0383) (0.0355)
HOMEOWNER 0.242*** -0.125 -0.0896
(0.0712) (0.0852) (0.0792)
Constant 1.708** 1.208*** 1.981*** 2.157*** 2.186***
(0.6890) (0.1450) (0.4900) (0.8270) (0.7680)
Observations 2,063 2,183 2,040 1,937 1,937
R-squared 0.134 0.236 0.083 0.14 0.259
Adjusted R-squared 0.112 0.222 0.065 0.116 0.238
County fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic/SE controls? Yes No No Yes Yes
Notes: Standard error is listed in parentheses. 
p-values are denoted by:  
*** p<0.01 
** p<0.05 
* p<0.10
Table 12 reveals some interesting findings. First, as with the voting data we analyzed with 
Prop. 1A, a single variable, ideology explains more than all of the socio-economic and 
demographic variables. We see this by comparing the R-squared value in column 2, which 
contains only the variable REP (and county fixed effects), with that in column 1, which 
includes all the demographic and socio-economic variables (and county fixed effects).62 
The positive coefficient on REP means that Republicans are more likely to support Prop. 
23. Another way of interpreting the results in column 2 is that a Republican is likely to 
answer “yes” to 1.513+1.208=2.722 of the five Prop. 23-related questions. This is the sum 
of the coefficients estimates for REP (1.513) and the CONSTANT (1.208).63
In column 3 of Table 12 we see that the urban form variables all have the expected signs. 
The results suggest that the farther a person lives from downtown (lnDISTANCE), the more 
likely he or she is to vote for Prop. 23, and that the higher the population density of the 
neighborhood (represented by lnZIPDEN), the less likely that resident is to vote for Prop. 
23. This is consistent with the idea that suburban residents face a higher burden of carbon 
mitigation regulation. Similarly, the coefficient on HOMEOWN is positive and significant, 
suggesting that suburban residents (who are more likely to own their home) support Prop. 
23. This positive coefficient is also consistent with homeowners believing Prop. 23 will 
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lower the value of that, for most households, which is their single largest asset. We revisit 
this idea later. Of these three variables, only lnZIPDEN is statistically significant. 
In column 4, we include urban form and demographic variables. The biggest change we 
see when comparing the results in column 4 to those in column 3 is that the coefficient on 
HOMEOWN changes from positive and significant to negative and insignificant. Controlling 
for socio-economic and demographic variables eliminates the statistical significance 
of HOMEOWN. Note also that the marginal contribution to explanatory power of the 
demographic variables is fairly large as the adjusted R-squared in column 4 of 0.116, is 
larger than the adjusted R-squared in column 3 of 0.0653.
Finally, column 5 presents the estimates of our unrestricted model. While the estimate 
of the coefficient on the HOMEOWN variable is shown not to be robust to demographic 
controls, the lnZIPDEN variable is robust to the inclusion of socio-economic, demographic 
and ideological variables, and the coefficient estimate of -0.0867, while smaller than in 
other columns, remains large in magnitude. 
VOTING DATA
We continue the analysis of Prop. 23, by turning to the voting data. Our intention is to 
estimate the same versions of equation (1) as are shown in Table 5 and Table 6 for the 
analysis of Prop. 1A. In the discussion of the Prop. 23 results, we highlight only the 
significant differences between the results of the voting data and survey data analyses. 
Summary statistics for the voting data are given in Table 4, at the beginning of this chapter. 
The results of our first analysis of Prop. 23 voting data are reported in Table 13. Here, we 
see a positive, approximately linear relationship between income and support for Prop. 23. 
We also see that unemployment is positive and marginally significant.
College-degreed voters opposed Prop. 23, on average, and unlike the individual regressions, 
the results suggest both young and old voters opposed Prop. 23, on average (with middle-
aged voters, the excluded category, being most likely to have supported it). Finally, the 
race and ethnicity variables suggest that Black and Hispanic voters were opposed to Prop. 
23, relative to the excluded (White) category.
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Table 13. OLS Regression, Prop. 23, 2010 Voting Data, Socio-Economic and 
Demographic-Only Restriction
Variable
Estimated Coefficients by OLS on Dependent Variable 
“Percent Voting Yes on Prop. 23”
PCT_23_Y
INC_L_20 -0.0952***
(0.0081)
INC_20_40 -0.0572***
(0.0085)
INC_40_60 -0.0400***
(0.0090)
INC_75_100 0.0430***
(0.0093)
INC_100_P 0.159***
(0.0075)
COLLEGE -0.325***
(0.0038)
BLACK -0.205***
(0.0047)
ASIAN 0.0031
(0.0034)
OTHER -0.0180***
(0.0053)
HISPANIC -0.130***
(0.0037)
YOUNG -0.0605***
(0.0050)
OLD -0.0104*
(0.0054)
UNEMPLOY 0.0158*
(0.0084)
Constant 0.409***
(0.0075)
Observations 23,066
R-squared 0.726
County fixed effects? Yes
Notes: Standard error is listed in parentheses. 
p-values are denoted by:  
*** p<0.01 
** p<0.05 
* p<0.10
Next we turn to discuss ideology and urban form, using the voting data. Table 14 contains 
these results.
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Table 14. Restricted and Unrestricted OLS Regressions; Prop. 23, 2010 Voting Data
Estimated Coefficients by OLS on Dependent Variable 
“Percent Voting Yes on Prop. 23”
PCT_23_Y
Variable
Socio-economic, 
Demographic
Only
Ideology 
Only
Urban Form 
Only
All But  
Ideology Unrestricted
UNEMPLOY 0.0158* -0.00675 0.00721
(0.0084) (0.0076) (0.0044)
BUSH 0.553*** 0.549***
(0.0022) (0.0026)
HOMEOWN 0.0809*** 0.0240*** 0.0012
(0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0016)
lnDISTANCE 0.0472*** 0.0377*** 0.00954***
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0004)
lnDENSITY -0.0107*** -0.0106*** -0.00566***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Constant 0.409*** 0.108*** 0.125*** 0.307*** 0.153***
(0.0075) (0.0014) (0.0054) (0.0083) (0.0049)
Observations 23,066 23,088 23,071 23,066 23,033
R-squared 0.726 0.89 0.716 0.777 0.925
County fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic/SE controls? Yes No No Yes Yes
Notes: Standard error is listed in parentheses. 
p-values are denoted by:  
*** p<0.01 
** p<0.05 
* p<0.10
Table 14 shows the results when including ideology, urban form, or all (unrestricted) 
variables. The specification in column 1 is identical to that in Table 13 and is reproduced to 
facilitate comparison between the various restrictions we impose on equation (1). Column 
2 shows the ideology-only results of the regression of PCT_23_Y on BUSH with fixed 
county effects; note again the high level of explanatory power when including only this 
ideology variable and county fixed effects.
Column 3 shows the results of the regression model with only three urban form variables. 
Here, we see that suburbanites voted against GHG mitigation; that is, in favor of Prop. 
23. This is seen especially by the positive coefficients on lnDISTANCE and negative 
coefficients on lnDENSTY. However, the magnitude of the urban form coefficients 
decreases in column 4 when demographic controls are added, particularly the coefficient 
on HOMEOWN. Column 5 shows the results of the unrestricted model. We see that two 
urban form variables (lnDISTANCE and lnDENSITY) retain their statistical significance 
even when controlling for ideology and other variables, though the magnitudes decrease 
considerably. 
Nonetheless, the results confirm our expectations from Hypothesis 1, that because 
suburban residents perceive that the incidence of a GHG regulatory regime falls more 
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heavily on them, they are more likely, on average, to vote against GHG mitigation efforts 
compared to urban residents.64 
We close this section with a comparison between the results obtained with survey and voting 
data for Prop. 23, and also by testing our Hypotheses 2 and 3. We test these hypotheses 
next, by taking a examining Prop. 23 voting preferences with respect to homeownership.
A Closer Look at Prop. 23 and Homeownership 
To test Hypotheses 2 and 3, we estimate an interaction model identical to the model 
of Prop. 1A, that we discuss in the subsection titled A Closer Look at Prop. 1A and 
Homeownership. The analysis presented here differs from that analysis in two ways. First, 
the dependent variable is PCT_23_Y, not PCT_1A_Y. Second, we use as the distance 
measure the distance to downtown rather than the distance to the nearest HSR station. In 
all other ways the models are identical and we refer the reader to the Prop. 1A discussion, 
above, for full model details.
The results presented in Table 15 confirm Hypotheses 2 and 3. Interpreting the results 
requires looking at two coefficient estimates, the estimate on HOMEOWN (−0.0410), 
and the estimate on the HOMEOWN/lnDISTANCE interaction (0.0141, represented by 
variable INTERACT). These estimates suggest that if the homeownership rate increases 
in downtown neighborhoods, support for Prop. 23 will decrease. This is consistent with 
Hypothesis 2.
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Table 15. OLS Regression with Homeowner-Distance Interactions; 
Prop. 23 (2010) and Capitalization
Variable 
Estimated Coefficients by OLS on Dependent Variable 
“Percent Voting Yes on Prop. 23”
PCT_23_Y
HOMEOWN -0.0410***
(0.00)
lnDISTANCE 0.00159**
(0.00)
lnDENSITY -0.00548***
(0.00)
INTERACT 0.0141***
(0.00)
Constant 0.176***
(0.01)
Observations 23,033
R-squared 0.925
Demographic/SE and 
Ideology controls?
Yes
County fixed effects? Yes
Notes: Standard error is listed in parentheses. 
p-values are denoted by:  
*** p<0.01 
** p<0.05 
* p<0.10
To illustrate, consider the effect of a 10% increase in the homeownership rate downtown. 
The interaction model above predicts that the probability of this downtown precinct 
supporting Prop. 23 will decrease by:
 -0.041 × 0.1 = -0.0041, or -0.41% 
that is, a decrease of 0.41% (less than a half-percentage point). In a neighborhood at the 
urban fringe (where lnDISTANCE takes on its maximum value of 4.4),65 the effect of a 10% 
increase in homeownership is: 
(-0.041 × 0.1) + (0.0141 × 4.4 × 0.1) = 0.0021, or 0.21%
that is, slightly more than a two-tenths of one percent increase in support for Prop. 23). 
These results are consistent with our Hypothesis 3, which in turn (like Hypothesis 2) is 
derived from the predictions of the monocentric city model from urban economics, which 
predicts that when the cost of transportation increase (e.g., as gas stations charge more 
for gas due to the cost of complying with the mandatory compressed air filling regulations, 
or more importantly, when the cap and trade requirements for oil refineries producing 
vehicle fuels causes the wholesale price of gasoline to rise), land values will rise in the 
city center and fall at the urban fringe.66 Our findings suggest the urban economics model 
helps explain voting decisions.
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Figure 7. Marginal Effect of Homeownership on Voting for Prop. 23, 
By Distance to Downtown
Notes: Marginal effect is calculated as -0.041+(0.0141× lnDISTANCE), units reflect change in predicted probability of 
voting yes due to change in homeownership rate.
Figure 7 plots the marginal effect of homeownership on voting for Prop. 23, by distance. 
Increasing the homeownership rate near the city center leads to a loss of support for Prop. 
23, while increasing the homeownership rate near the urban fringe leads to an increase in 
support for Prop. 23. This is precisely what we would expect to find if the AB 32 regulations 
increased the cost of GHG emissions, and if voters voted in a way to maximize their home 
values.
Comparing Results: Survey and Voting Data
The final Prop. 23 issues we consider are the comparability of the findings between the 
voting and survey data. We have already addressed these issues to some extent in our 
discussion of the results using voting data for Prop. 23. But, here, we distill these findings 
into an easy to read summary table (Table 16). The difference between the former analyses 
and this one is that here we make the comparison across estimates contained in Table 23 
(displayed later in this chapter) and Table 27 (in Appendix B), using the more appropriate, 
unrestricted regressions.67
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Table 16. Comparing Coefficient Estimates from Analysis of Survey and Voting 
Data for Prop. 23
Variable/Category Coefficient Estimates Results
lnDISTANCE Positive in both analyses, but statistically significant only in the voting data.
lnDENSITY Negative and significant in both analyses.
HOMEOWN Positive in the voting data, negative in the survey data, and not significant in either.* 
INCOME Shows more support for Prop. 23 among the highest income voters in the voting data, but 
shows support is highest among middle income groups in the survey data; both sets have 
some significant and some insignificant estimates.
UNEMPLOYMENT Positive and insignificant in both. 
AGE Shows young voters are against Prop. 23 in both data sets, and statistically significant in the 
survey data only. However, estimates from the voting data show old voters are also against 
Prop. 23 (with estimates statistically significant), but the survey data shows old voters are for 
Prop. 23 (and this effect was statistically significant). 
COLLEGE Shows that the educated are against Prop. 23 in both data sets, but statistically significant 
only in the voting data.
RACE/ETHNICITY Shows all non-White groups support Prop. 23, with significant estimates in the voting data; in 
the survey data, no estimates are statistically significant.**
IDEOLOGY Shows conservative voters are for Prop. 23 in both datasets, and in all cases this variable is 
statistically significant.
Notes: * See discussion of interaction terms above in the text; homeownership is statistically significant in the voting 
data, but the effect depends on whether the location in question is suburban or urban. 
** The exception here is for the OTHER category, which, as explained above, is a residual category for respondents 
not falling into one of the four named race/ethnicity groups. 
In addition to comparing coefficient estimates for Prop. 23 across Tables 23 and 27, we 
also use the survey data to estimate the interaction model described above for Prop. 23 
(where we include the variable INTERACT to test Hypotheses 2 and 3). In the survey 
data, the estimated coefficient on the interaction is negative but not significant. Likewise, 
the coefficient on HOMEOWN is negative but not significant. Thus, we do not find the 
same support for Hypotheses 2 and 3 in the survey data as we do in the voting data. 
This could be evidence of an inference bias, but it is also possible that the relatively small 
survey sample size yields small standard errors. Among the other possible explanations 
is that the distance measure, based on ZCTAs, is not calculated at a sufficiently refined 
geographical level.
Taken together, comparing results across survey and voting data shows that the results 
regarding Hypothesis 1 are quite robust with regard to Prop. 23. The results concerning 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 are less robust as they are not statistically significant in the survey 
data. Nonetheless, we feel that, on the whole, the results of our analysis lend support to 
the monocentric city model.
PROP. 181: PASSENGER RAIL AND CLEAN AIR BOND ACT (1994)
The proposition analyzed in this report’s final case study is Prop. 181, the Passenger Rail 
and Clean Air Bond Act of 1994. Before describing the details of this proposition, we first 
provide a brief history of ballot propositions from the early 1990s, because it is important to 
appreciate the special context of that time. Later in this report we provide more details on 
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propositions from this time, as well as for all transit-related ballot propositions from 1990 
to 2010.
From a public transit perspective, a number of fascinating propositions were considered in 
California in the early 1990s. Between 1990 and 1994, no less than eight propositions had 
a distinct transit component, with three winning majority support. Among these propositions 
were two proposals to increase the gasoline tax, one of which passed. We discuss these 
gas tax propositions at greater length in the next section. Another three propositions were 
legislative bond initiatives, known as the Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Acts of 1990, 
1992 and 1994, respectively.
Prop. 108, the Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1990, was the first of these three 
major bond acts and was approved by 56% of voters. The bonds that were ultimately sold 
as a result of Prop. 108 provided state funding for light rail and other transit projects around 
the state, which were also funded with various local sources.68 Prop. 156, the Passenger 
Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1992, was defeated by a narrow margin.
Prop. 181, the Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1994, was also defeated. After 
the 1994 election, a transit-related ballot proposition would not appear on the ballot for 
another four years. Few, if any, of the subsequent propositions focused so heavily on 
transit. Indeed, it is fair to say that the early 1990s was a unique time for understanding 
Californians attitudes towards transit as well as various funding mechanisms for transit 
infrastructure. 
A good description of this proposition69 explains that Prop. 181 is a: 
$1 billion legislative bond act that provides funds for acquisition of rights of way, capital 
expenditures and acquisitions of rolling stock for intercity rail, commuter rail, and rail 
transit programs. Background: In 1989, transit organizations and legislators agreed 
on a 10 year, $60 billion mass transit program. Approximately $18 billion was to be 
provided from state resources for capital outlay, and the rest from the federal and local 
governments. The first parts of the state program included two bond measures and a 
permanent gasoline tax increase Propositions 108, 111 and 116 and were approved 
by a slim margin in 1990. Two subsequent, $1 billion bond proposals, one in 1992 and 
the other in 1994, were placed on the ballot by the Legislature. The 1992 proposal, 
Proposition 156, failed. Proposition 181 is the 1994 $1 billion bond proposal.
This concludes our background discussion of this proposition. In the remainder of this 
section we analyze in detail Prop. 181 from 1994.70 
Voting Data
Table 17 contains summary statistics for all of the variables used in the analysis below.71
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Table 17. Summary Statistics, 1990 Census and Voting Data Variables
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
PCT_181_Y 21,266 0.37 0.13 0 1
INC0 20,924 0.20 0.15 0 1
INC25 20,924 0.20 0.11 0 1
INC50 20,924 0.21 0.09 0 1
INC100 20,924 0.20 0.13 0 1
INC150 20,924 0.07 0.11 0 1
COLLEGE 21,013 0.23 0.17 0 1
BLACK 21,021 0.07 0.16 0 1
ASIAN 21,021 0.08 0.11 0 1
OTHER 21,021 0.12 0.16 0 1
HISPANIC 21,021 0.23 0.24 0 1
YOUNG 21,021 0.29 0.12 0 1
OLD 21,021 0.12 0.10 0 1
BUSH 21,098 0.38 0.17 0 1
HOMEOWN 20,924 0.58 0.27 0 1
lnDISTANCE 20,452 2.80 0.83 0.03 4.39
lnDENSITY 21,461 7.04 2.10 0 10.95
Source: Census of Population and Housing, 1990, and SWDB voting data from 1994.
Table 18 presents our first set of regression results. As in the first two case study analyses, 
these results are from a restricted version of equation (1), which includes only socio-
economic and demographic variables. With this restriction we are interested in the effects 
of these variables only. 
Table 18 demonstrates, as predicted, that higher income is associated with less support 
for transit. Support for transit is higher when a larger fraction of the block group has a 
college degree. Higher proportions of non-White racial and ethnic groups are associated 
with support for transit, and this is most pronounced for the Black variable, somewhat 
pronounced for the Hispanic variable, and only slightly positive for the Asian variable. As 
predicted, higher proportions of elderly voters are associated with support for Prop. 181.
Next we explore the robustness of the coefficient estimates on the socio-economic and 
demographic variables. Looking at the coefficients on the income and demographic variables 
in the unrestricted version of the model (presented in column 3 of Table 22 in Chapter III), we 
see the income effect is less pronounced compared to the estimates in Table 18 (a restricted 
regression). The coefficients on the two lowest income groups remain statistically significant, 
but the values are less than half those in the restricted case. The coefficients on the highest 
income groups become statistically insignificant in this full specification. The coefficient on the 
COLLEGE variable remains (statistically) significant and decreases in magnitude by about 
40%. All the racial and ethnic coefficients remain significant and decrease in magnitude by 
about half. Finally, among the age variables, only OLD remains significant, and it decreases 
to about one-third of the size reported in Table 18.
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Table 18. OLS Regression; Prop. 181 (1994) Voting Data, Socio-Economic and 
Demographic-Only Restriction
Variable
Estimated Coefficients by OLS on Dependent Variable
“Percent Voting Yes on Prop. 181A”
PCT_181_Y
INC0 0.168***
(0.0075)
INC25 0.0843***
(0.0085)
INC50 0.0393***
(0.0093)
INC100 -0.0609***
(0.0087)
INC150 -0.0945***
(0.0079)
COLLEGE 0.367***
(0.0041)
BLACK 0.329***
(0.0035)
ASIAN 0.0442***
(0.0042)
OTHER 0.0563***
(0.0079)
HISPANIC 0.139***
(0.0055)
YOUNG 0.0741***
(0.0056)
OLD 0.0389***
(0.0057)
Constant 0.236***
(0.0069)
Observations 20,837
R-squared 0.781
County fixed effects? Yes
Notes: Standard error is listed in parentheses. 
p-values are denoted by:  
*** p<0.01 
** p<0.05 
* p<0.10
Table 19 presents the regression results for all of the specifications we estimated. As 
above, we do not report estimates of coefficients on the demographic variables, to conserve 
space. 
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Table 19. Restricted and Unrestricted OLS Regressions; Prop. 181, 1994 Voting Data
Estimated Coefficients by OLS on Dependent Variable 
“Percent Voting Yes on Prop. 181”
PCT_181_Y
Variable
Socio-economic, 
Demographic
Only
Ideology 
Only
Urban Form 
Only
All But  
Ideology Unrestricted
BUSH -0.488*** -0.345***
(0.0030) (0.0038)
HOMEOWN -0.0983*** -0.0184*** -0.0219***
(0.0022) (0.0029) (0.0024)
lnDISTANCE -0.0494*** -0.0265*** -0.0158***
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0006)
lnDENSITY 0.00425*** 0.00464*** 0.00142***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Constant 0.236*** 0.602*** 0.640*** 0.333*** 0.486***
(0.0069) (0.0019) (0.0053) (0.0085) (0.0074)
Observations 20,837 21,020 19,805 19,800 19,723 
R-squared 0.781 0.787 0.663 0.802 0.859
County fixed 
effects?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic/ 
SE controls?
Yes No No Yes Yes
Notes: Standard error is listed in parentheses. 
p-values are denoted by:  
*** p<0.01 
** p<0.05 
* p<0.10
The first finding to note from Table 19 is that one variable, BUSH, the fraction voting for 
the Republican president in the 1992 election (which is our proxy for ideology) explains 
slightly more than all of the socio-economic and demographic variables combined. This 
is evident by the R-squared value of 0.781 in column 1, and the higher value of 0.787 in 
column 2. Analysis in column 3 that includes only the three urban form variables (and 
with the county fixed effects) results in a lower R-squared value of 0.663, while including 
demographic variables and urban form variables (column 4) raises the R-squared value to 
0.802. Finally, in the unrestricted specification (column 5), we note the R-squared is 0.859. 
These values can be used to assess how well the model fits the data, with larger values 
indicating better fit. 
It is also important to note how the coefficient estimates change when subjected to various 
levels of control. As noted above, the general pattern depicted in the discussion of the 
socio-economic and demographic only specification (where all effects are less pronounced 
when subjected to the full set of controls). The same pattern holds true for the ideology 
and urban form variables. The coefficient on ideology (BUSH) decreases in magnitude 
from -0.488 to -0.345 when no variables are restricted. As for the urban form variables, 
in column 3 the coefficient on HOMEOWN is -0.0983, the coefficient on lnDISTANCE is 
-0.0494, and the coefficient on lnDENSITY is 0.00425. All of these coefficient estimates 
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decrease to about 25% of the restricted-model values when subjected to the full set of 
controls (unrestricted model). However, while the magnitude of the effects is lower in the 
unrestricted model than in the restricted model, we consistently find statistically significant 
coefficient estimates, lending support for our Hypothesis 1 regarding suburbanization and 
voting. 
Finally, to test Hypotheses 2 and 3, we estimate the same interaction model presented in 
the first two case studies. We do not report these results here to conserve space, but we 
note that the results are inconsistent with our expectations. The coefficient on HOMEOWN 
(is -0.09 while on INTERACT it is positive) 0.024. This suggests that homeownership 
downtown reduces support for Prop. 181, while homeownership in the distant suburbs is 
associated with a slight increase in support for Prop. 181. This is exactly counter to our 
expectations and we do not have a good explanation for what may be driving these results.
Thus, the results of our hypotheses regarding Prop. 181 are mixed. We find strong support 
for Hypothesis 1 here, as above. However, although we find strong support for Hypotheses 
2 and 3 in the first two case studies, here, not only do we not find support, but we find 
evidence that is exactly opposite of our expectations. At this point, all we can do is suggest 
that future research attempt to sort this out.
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III. ALL TRANSIT-RELATED CALIFORNIA STATE BALLOT 
INITIATIVES, 1990-2010
As discussed in the Introduction, this is a study of 20 transit-related California ballot 
propositions from 1990 through 2010. We were able to find survey data, voting data, or 
both, for nineteen of these. In four cases we analyze only survey data, in fourteen cases 
we analyze only voting data, and in one case we analyze both. Table 20 indicates the 
availability of data for each proposition, and, for convenience, it also reproduces information 
about the propositions (e.g., percent in favor) from Table 2 from the Introduction.
Table 20. Data Sources and Summary Information for Ballot Propositions
Ye
ar
M
on
th
Pr
op
os
iti
on
 
N
um
be
r
Name/Description %
 Y
es
 V
ot
e
Su
rv
ey
 D
at
a
Vo
tin
g 
D
at
a
2010 Nov 23 Suspend AB 32 until unemployment is below 5.5% for one year 38.4  
2010 Nov 22 Transportation Funding Protection 60.7 
2008 Nov 1A California High-Speed Rail Bond. S.B. 1856 52.7 
2008 Nov 10 Alternative Fuel Vehicles and Renewable Energy 40.5 
2008 Feb 91 Transportation Funding Protection 41.6 
2006 Nov 1A Transportation Funding Protection 77.0 
2006 Nov 1B Air Quality, and Port Security Bond Act 61.4 
2006 Nov 87 Alternative energy. Tax on California oil producers 45.4 
2002 Nov 51 Transportation Protection of Motor Vehicle Sales Tax 42.2 
2002 Mar 42 Transportation Congestion Improvement Act 69.1 
1998 Nov 2 Transportation Funding Protection 75.4 
1998 Nov 7 Air Quality Improvement 43.6 
1994 Nov 181 Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1994 34.9 
1994 Nov 185 Public Transportation Trust Funds. Gasoline Sales Tax 19.5 
1992 Nov 156 Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1992 48.1 
1992 Nov 157 Toll Roads and Highways 28.2 
1990 Nov 125 Motor Vehicle Fuel Tax. Rail Transit Funding 45.6
1990 Jun 108 Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1990 56.3 
1990 Jun 111 Traffic Congestion Relief and Spending Limitation Act of 1990 52.4 
1990 Jun 116 Rail Transportation. Bond Act 53.3 
Source: California Secretary of State Office (Debra Bowen), “Statewide Election Results,” http://www.sos.ca.gov/
elections/statewide-elections/ (Accessed March 10, 2013).
In this section we estimate our unrestricted model for each of the propositions, where 
possible. Doing this is possible for all 15 of the propositions for which we have voting data. 
However, only one of the four propositions for which we have survey data contains enough 
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variables to estimate the unrestricted model. Nonetheless, we come quite close to our goal 
of estimating either equation (1) or equation (2) for each proposition. 
The propositions we analyze in this section cover a diverse array of transit issues. An 
implication of this is that we do not view the results as providing systematic tests of our 
hypotheses. For example, the hypotheses we posit require the net benefits of the proposed 
policies to vary spatially. It is not clear, for example, that transportation funding protection 
propositions have net benefits that vary spatially, and there are other propositions about 
which this fact would also apply. 
Therefore, in the discussion below, although we touch on hypothesis tests, our aim 
here is not primarily to test hypotheses, but rather to look at all transportation-related 
ballot propositions through a common lens. We view the results we present below as a 
useful resource for future researchers who may have a particular interest in one of the 
propositions that was not our focus. To the extent possible, we also attempt to draw out 
similarities and broad themes in the results, but we emphasize that much of the discussion 
related to these results is more speculative in nature, compared to the much more careful 
hypothesizing presented in the three case studies of the previous chapter.
SURVEY DATA
Before presenting regression results, we briefly describe the new sources of data analyzed 
below, beginning with survey data sources. Three Field Poll surveys from 1990 contain 
questions about Propositions 108, 111, and 116. We analyze one of these surveys.72 We 
describe the source of this data and the specific surveys analyzed in the Data Appendix. 
Thus, to study Props 108, 111, and 116 we utilize a single Field Poll survey. Unfortunately, 
while the survey we analyze from 1990 contains information on the respondent’s county, 
it does not contain information at a more refined geographic area (e.g., zip code), and this 
fact prohibits us from estimating the unrestricted version of equation (2) for Propositions 
108, 111, and 116.
To study Prop. 42 from 2002, we analyze another Field Poll survey.73 The 2002 Field Poll 
survey contained questions about Prop. 42 and also contained zip code identifiers for 
respondents.74 The large majority of Field Poll surveys that we pre-screened did not have 
zip identifiers, and so we were fortunate to locate a survey that asked about a transportation 
proposition and included zip code identifiers.75 
VOTING DATA
As with the analysis of Prop. 181, SWDB voting data from 1992 and 1994 elections are 
merged with 1990 Census data for block groups. For propositions from the 1998 and 2002 
elections SWDB data is merged with 2000 Census data for block groups. Finally, SWDB 
data from 2006 through 2010 elections are merged with 20062010 (five-year estimate) ACS 
data for census block groups, as is also true for the analyses of Prop. 1A and Prop. 23.
The results of estimating the unrestricted models presented above, using the above-
mentioned survey and voting data, are presented in Tables 21, 22, and 23. Table 21 
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contains the results of the analysis of the survey data, Table 22 shows the results of the 
analysis of the voting data for elections taking place between 1992 and 2002, and Table 
23 reports the results of the analysis of the voting data for elections taking place between 
2006 and 2010. To conserve space, we do not report standard error estimates in any of 
these tables, however the statistical significance of the estimates is indicated by asterisks, 
as in all the tables of regression results reported above.
Table 21. Linear Probability Models, Survey Data, 1990 and 2004 Elections
Variable FAVOR_PROP_108 FAVOR_PROP_111 FAVOR_PROP_116 FAVOR_PROP_42
INCOME_L_20 -0.0315 -0.0327 0.0145 0.0561
INCOME_20_40 -0.0720* -0.0775* 0.0146 0.029
INCOME_60_P -0.0466 0.0278 0.0641 0.0594
COLLEGE 0.106*** 0.116*** 0.113*** 0.0660*
BLACK 0.0452 0.097 -0.104 -0.0199
ASIAN -0.210** -0.0378 -0.0693 0.00364
HISPANIC -0.0453 -0.0751 -0.0362 0.0477
YOUNG 0.0501 -0.02 0.0772** -0.0196
OLD -0.0154 0.0733* 0.026 0.0943*
REP -0.0892*** -0.0474 -0.150*** -0.0304
HOMEOWN -0.0459 -0.0614 -0.0524 -0.0619
lnDISTANCE -0.0256
lnDENSITY -0.00375
Constant 0.775*** 0.631*** 0.664*** 0.750***
Observations 990 1,075 956 752
R-squared 0.037 0.03 0.045 0.016
Adjusted R-squared 0.0261 0.0195 0.0334 -0.0023
County fixed effects? No No No No
Notes: Standard errors are not reported in this table. 
p-values are denoted by:  
*** p<0.01 
** p<0.05 
* p<0.10
Summary statistics for the two surveys used in the analysis reportedin Table 21 are 
presented in Appendix B in Tables 24 and 25. We delay interpreting the results in columns 
1, 2, and 3 of Tabel 21 for now. In the last column, we analyze Prop. 42 from 2002; a 
transportation funding protection proposition. Perhaps due to the small sample size, we 
do not find any statistically significant estimates at the 5% level, and as a result not much 
is said about this below. 
We next present results using voting data in the following two tables. 
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As previously discussed, Table 17 provides summary statistics for the variables used in 
the analysis of the 1990s elections. Summary statistics for variables used in the analysis 
of the 1998, 2000, and 2002 elections can be found in Table 26 in Appendix A. Table 22 is 
split between propositions 185 and 51 to emphasize that the independent variables in the 
analyses are drawn from two different census years. Due to the large number of results 
presented in Table 22, we delay interpreting coefficient estimates until the discussion of 
broad themes later in this section. 
Summary statistics for the independent variables used in the analyses reported in Table 23 
are reported in Table 4 (in Chapter I). Due to the large number of results presented in Table 
23, we delay discussing results until the discussion of broad themes, to which we now turn. 
DISCUSSION: BROAD THEMES IN TRANSPORTATION INITIATIVES
We discuss the results presented in the tables above by dividing them into three time 
periods: Early Period (1990-1994), Middle Period (1998-2002) and Recent Period (2006-
2010). 
Early Period: 1990-1994
In the case study of Prop. 181 in the previous chapter, we provide some historical context 
for the Early Period. As emphasized there, this early time period contains a fascinating 
array of propositions, from a transit perspective. For example, although it is conventional 
wisdom that the U.S. citizenry detests gasoline taxes, Prop. 111 (June 1990) was 
approved by 52.4% of voters, and raised gasoline taxes by nine cents (see summary 
in voter information pamphlets in Appendix C). Two other propositions from this election 
(Props. 108 and 116) were also approved by voters, paving the way for state bond sales 
to improve transportation.
As propositions 108 and 116 were bond propositions to fund rail transit, it may not be 
surprising that in Table 21 the coefficient on REP is negative for these propositions. 
However, surprisingly, the coefficient on REP for Prop. 111, which proposed a permanent 
increase in the gas tax, is not statistically significant. Though still negative, it is smaller in 
magnitude than for the other two propositions. This suggests that, at least in the 1990s, 
conservative voters were willing to support gas taxes. Prop. 111 promised traffic congestion 
relief, and we speculate that conservative voters may have been willing to support it 
because the text of the proposition appeared to favor funding of highway construction over 
transit infrastructure. 
Had data been available, these three propositions would have provided fertile testing 
grounds for our Hypotheses 1 through 3.76 Unfortunately, the survey data we found did not 
contain geographic identifiers at a sufficiently refined level, such as the census tract level, 
or even zip code level, and this prohibited us from generating the variables needed to test 
the hypotheses.
A second gas tax proposition was presented to voters in 1990 (Prop. 125). This is the one 
proposition in the study period for which we were unable to find any data. This lack of data 
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is again unfortunate as our theoretical framework yields clear predictions here – suburban 
residents should have opposed this proposition, as it would have raised the cost of driving, 
and moreover the proposition proposed using the revenue to fund transit infrastructure. 
This proposition was defeated, receiving only 45% of the vote.77 
In the November 1992 election, we gathered complete data on two propositions: Prop. 
156 and Prop. 157 (coefficient estimate results are shown in Table 22). The first of these 
propositions is more interesting from the perspective of our hypotheses,78 as it was the 
second of three rail transit bond initiatives. (We analyze the third of these in our Prop. 
181 case study above.) Like Prop. 181, Prop. 156 failed. However, looking at the results 
in Table 22 for Prop. 156, we find support for Hypothesis 1, as suburban residents were 
more likely to vote against it (note the negative coefficient on lnDISTANCE and positive 
coefficient on lnDENSITY). This is to say, the results for Prop. 156 and quite similar to 
those for Prop. 181. 
The final election in this period was the November 1994 election, which presented voters 
both Prop. 181 and Prop. 185. The previous chapter discusses both of these in more 
detail in the case study of Prop. 181. As described in the preceding paragraph the results 
from Prop. 181, like those from Prop. 156, lend support for our Hypothesis 1. One of the 
Prop. 185 results is unexpected, namely that the coefficient on lnDENSITY is negative. We 
would expect voters in dense neighborhoods to support gas taxes to fund transit, as the 
net benefits are often concentrated on these neighborhoods. We would point out that, from 
a review of newspaper articles on the propositions, we found that the campaign for Prop. 
185 was mired in controversy, and we suspect this or another idiosyncratic aspect of this 
proposition may be behind the unexpected finding regarding the sign on lnDENSITY.79 It is 
also possible that this controversy – rather than distaste for gas taxes – is the major reason 
Prop. 185 garnered such a small percent of the vote (19.5%). Nonetheless, although for 
propositions like Prop. 185 we expect the coefficients on lnDENSITY and lnDISTANCE to 
have opposite signs, in terms of our Hypothesis 1, the results concerning Prop. 185 lend 
at least partial support as the coefficient on lnDISTANCE is negative and significant, and 
interestingly is greater in magnitude than any of the lnDISTANCE coefficients presented in 
Table 22 for the early 1990s. To put this differently, of all propositions from the early 1990s 
in Table 22, suburban residents (measured by distance to downtown) were most opposed 
to Prop. 185.
Middle Period: 1998-2002
Four transportation-related propositions were identified from this period. Prop. 7 (1998) 
was an environmental proposition with a vehicle emissions component. The other three 
propositions from this time period (Props. 2, 42 and 51) were all what we classify as 
transportation funding protection propositions. The subsequent decade would see several 
more such protection propositions, and we discuss those in greater depth in this section. 
But first, we briefly discuss Prop. 7.
Supporters of Prop. 7 claimed it “Uses Private sector tax incentives to reduce toxic 
emissions from buses…” Individuals in urban areas should be subject to greater air 
pollution, as the greater concentration of vehicles in urban areas magnifies the adverse 
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health effects of vehicular pollution. Thus, one might expect that the urban form variables 
would be important here. However, and similar to the results for Prop. 185, the coefficient 
on lnDENSITY does not confirm this expectation, although the coefficient on lnDISTANCE 
does. And again, similar to the case of Prop. 185, the coefficient on lnDISTANCE is 
greater in magnitude than another of the other propositions we consider from the decade 
in which it was decided. Thus, the findings regarding urban form provide mixed support for 
Hypothesis 1.
Regarding the transportation funding protection propositions, we must admit that we were 
not able to become as familiar with this class of propositions as we were with many others. 
At the same time, we suspect that voters may also not be very familiar with these types 
of propositions. As a result, our hypotheses tests here are more speculative and we offer 
them with the hope that our thinking may aid readers of this report who are interested in 
the transportation funding protection phenomenon. Given the large number of propositions 
that fall into this category, it would seem this is an area deserving of future attention. 
The basic premise behind these funding protection propositions was to make sure taxes 
that people paid at the pump were to go to transportation purposes and not be siphoned-
off to the general fund. For this 1998-2002 period, we have voting data for two of these 
protection propositions, Prop. 2 and Prop. 51. We also have survey data for one: Prop. 
42. As mentioned briefly in the paragraph following Table 21, the survey data does not 
yield any significant estimates, and so here we focus on the results from the voting data. 
One aspect of this class of transportation funding protection propositions is that they are 
heterogeneous. As evidence, we note that Prop. 51 was endorsed by the California Transit 
Association (a pro-transit organization), while Prop. 2 was endorsed by the California 
Taxpayer Association (a fiscally conservative organization). While the coefficients on the 
DOLE variable (our proxy for ideology from this time period) are negative for both Props. 2 
and 51, it is greater in magnitude for Prop. 51, which was endorsed by the transit association. 
Given what seems to be the transit focus of Prop. 51, one might expect suburban residents 
to be opposed to Prop. 51, but the coefficient estimates on lnDISTANCE and lnDENSITY 
(which are positive and negative, respectively) are contrary to this expectation.
We conclude this discussion of transportation funding protection propositions in 1998-2002 
period by reiterating that more work is needed to better understand voter preferences for 
this class of propositions. Our results do not yield consistent findings here.
Recent Period: 2006-2010
Like the Early Period (1990-1994), the Recent Period (2006-2010) offers some fascinating 
propositions to analyze, some that will dramatically shape the future of transit for years to 
come. These include Prop. 1A and Prop. 23, discussed in detail as case studies in Chapter II. 
This Recent Period (refer to Table 23) presents the continuation of the transportation 
funding protection movement, with Props 1A (from 2006), 91 and 22. Finally, a few other 
propositions are of interest. Prop. 87 was a proposed gas tax, but on producers. Two bond 
acts (Props. 10 and 1B) include environmental components. 
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We begin with the protection propositions. First, we can dispense with discussing Prop. 
91, as its supporters eventually encouraged voters to vote “no,” arguing Prop. 91 was 
no longer needed (see the information on Prop. 91 presented in Appendix C). This sort 
of idiosyncrasy makes this proposition a poor candidate for analysis to draw out broad 
themes.
Of the remaining two propositions (Prop. 1A (2006) and Prop. 22), we see that suburban 
voters supported these, as seen by the positive coefficient on lnDISTANCE.80 Conservative 
voters also supported these, especially Prop. 22, which can be seen by the positive 
coefficient on BUSH. 
Turning to Prop. 87, a gas tax on oil producers, we think our hypotheses might apply 
here. Although supporters of this proposition argued that Prop. 87, “makes it illegal [for 
oil companies] to pass the cost to consumers,”81 our knowledge of tax incidence theory 
suggests to us that gasoline consumers would end up paying higher prices, and many of 
them would come to this conclusion on their own. Indeed, the coefficient on lnDISTANCE 
is negative. This coefficient estimate is greater in magnitude than any other lnDISTANCE 
coefficient during this period except for Prop. 1A (2008) and Prop. 23. 
Proposition 10 proposed $5 billion in bond sales for alternative fuel vehicles. It is not clear 
that the net benefits of this policy vary spatially, but it is possible that they are concentrated 
on suburban voters who drive more. It is also possible that they are concentrated on 
dense neighborhoods, which suffer from higher levels of air pollution. Prop. 1B was a 
transportation bond. The text of the proposition indicates the funds would be used to 
support both roads and transit. Thus, like Prop. 10, it is not clear that our hypotheses apply 
to these propositions, and it is not clear that the net benefits vary spatially.
The results in Table 23 suggest that voters perceived the net benefits of Prop. 1B as 
falling on urbanites, as the coefficient on lnDISTANCE is negative, and the coefficient on 
lnDENSITY is positive. However, for Prop. 10, the coefficient on lnDISTANCE is positive, 
indicating the net benefits could fall on suburbanites, but the coefficient on lnDENSITY is 
negative, suggesting voters might not see the net benefits of Prop. 10 as varying spatially.
In discussing the results in this section, we have not addressed the estimates on any of the 
socio-economic or demographic variables. We leave it to the interested reader to consult 
Tables 21-23. Whatever the shortcomings of a statistical approach like the one we have 
taken in this report, one of its virtues is that it enables conveying a large amount of data 
without requiring a large number of words.
This concludes our discussion of broad themes across the propositions. The major lesson 
we take away from the analysis presented in this section is that, although this report 
focuses on transportation-related propositions, the 20 propositions we selected for study 
in fact represent a broad range of issues, and thus, it is not easy to identify broad lessons. 
Further identification of broad trends is left as a task for future research.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Direct legislation offers researchers a type of laboratory for studying the preferences of 
voters on various issues. Over the last 20 years, Californians have voted on many transit-
related issues. We have estimated regressions to test a variety of hypotheses related to 
the role of access and capitalization effects in determining voting patterns. Economics 
logic predicts that a voter is more likely to support a transit investment if she is more likely 
to use it (the access effect) and if the voter is a homeowner who believes that her property 
will appreciate in value because of the home’s proximity to an increasingly valuable piece 
of transport infrastructure (the capitalization effect). 
In this report, we have presented evidence supporting both of these hypotheses. Throughout 
this report, we have been careful to consider other relevant factors, such as residential 
ideological sorting, such that liberals tend to live in the center city and conservatives tend 
to live in the suburbs. 
Our evidence of an access effect and a capitalization effect suggests that there will 
be consequences of the median voter living further and further from city centers. As 
employment suburbanizes, this trend predicts that, all else equal, support for public transit 
projects will decline. 
While we have presented some results using survey-level micro data, most of our 
regressions have been based on data featuring the census block as the unit of analysis. 
While we recognize the concern with ecological regressions, we believe that it is important 
to note that, with our focus on distance, our study’s findings are less sensitive to standard 
ecological regression critiques than the typical paper. At no point in this paper did we state 
a hypothesis related to interactions of share variables, such as conjecturing that minority 
households who are homeowners are more likely to support public transit. This type of 
interaction cannot be tested using aggregate data. Instead, our focus was the distance to the 
CBD and public transit infrastructure gradients. In testing Hypotheses 2 and 3 we examined 
the interaction of a census block’s share of homeowners and distance to the infrastructure, 
but this interaction does not suffer from an ecological regression critique because there is 
no variation in “distance to the transit infrastructure” for any two homeowners in the same 
census block. Instead, the variation that allowed us to estimate this interaction term was 
based on observing different communities with the same homeownership share that were 
different distances to the public transit infrastructure. 
Turning to the implications of our results for policy, to us the most obvious implication 
is that encouraging urban living will cause support for transit to increase. To some, this 
conclusion may be obvious. However, this conclusion is not obvious to everyone, and our 
empirical findings provide estimates of the magnitude by which reversing suburbanization 
will increase political support for transit. 
Previous research, including some we have produced, has documented that urban 
residents are more likely to use transit and also have smaller carbon footprints than 
suburban residents. Therefore, a policy that encourages urban living has the direct effect 
of increasing transit use and diminishing harmful environmental impacts. However, in this 
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report we provided evidence that such a policy will also increase political support for transit; 
thus, successful pro-urban policies not only have the immediate effect of increasing transit 
use and lowering carbon emissions, but over time such policies will lead to better urban 
infrastructure, which is likely to further encourage urban living. 
How can policy makers encourage urban living? We did not address this question in this 
report. However, based on our knowledge of the literature and previous research, we offer 
the following ideas. Providing more systematic answers to this question should be the 
focus of future research.
Policy makers at the local level are perhaps most important. We have three main 
suggestions for local policy makers. First, land use regulations that raise the price of 
urban housing should be seriously reconsidered. We recognize that there are some valid 
reasons, including aesthetic concerns, for limiting the height of buildings and the density 
of neighborhoods. Likewise, taxing developers to provide affordable housing is certainly a 
well-intentioned policy. However, our impression is that in many cases in California, these 
regulations have had the effect of raising the cost of urban housing and reducing social 
welfare. Thus, all land use regulations should be subject to scrutiny, no matter how well 
intentioned. Some of these regulations will pass the cost-benefit test, but others will not.
Second, local policy makers should work to improve schools. Many households leave 
cities in search of better schools, which they believe can be found in suburbs. Third, many 
households leave cities in search of the safety of suburbs, and local policy makers should 
work to improve safety. 
Of course there are no magic bullets for improving schools or reducing crime, and we are 
agnostic about which tactics are most likely to achieve these objectives. For example, 
both “liberal” polices, such as increasing state-level involvement in education, and 
“conservative” policies, such as encouraging charter schools, have merit. Likewise, both 
community policing and data-driven approaches to patrolling both have their supporters 
and opponents, but we believe there are situations where both tactics are likely to succeed. 
In short, we encourage local policy makers to be creative and open-minded in their 
approaches to schools and policing, as these public services are critical to encouraging 
urban living.
State-level policy makers should try to support cities in the three areas mentioned above. 
The purpose of legislation like California Senate Bill 375 (2008), is to encourage cities and 
metropolitan planning organizations to better integrate land use and transportation plans. 
More polices along these lines would be welcome. Perhaps other state-level polices could 
be devised to help ensure that wasteful local-level land use regulations can be avoided. It 
is possible that state policy could also improve policing and schooling. More research in 
this area is needed.
At the federal level, certain anti-urban policies, such as the home mortgage interest 
deduction, have the effect of encouraging suburbanization. The above-mentioned 
local, state and federal policy recommendations have been put forward by other urban 
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economists.82 Our twist on these recommendations is that encouraging households to live 
in central cities will increase political support for transit. 
Another finding of our study is that homeowners near transit infrastructure are more likely 
to support public transit, and this suggests that these individuals gain a larger share of 
the benefits of these projects. Should such findings bolster the case for these individuals 
paying a larger share of such projects?
We are not convinced that the answer to the above question is “yes.” However, we do think 
that policy makers should pay more attention to land market effects when drafting policies. 
This also applies when writing propositions. For example, one possible reason Prop. 111, 
the gas tax proposition from 1990, passed is that it bundled a gas tax, the incidence of 
which falls most heavily on suburban voters who drive more, with spending on road and 
highway infrastructure, the benefits of which fall on these same suburban voters. 
Thus one non-obvious lesson from this study is that future propositions to fund transit 
might be bundled with policies that will benefit suburban voters. Of course, every politician 
is aware of the utility of bundling policies to enable compromise solutions. However, we 
would guess that most policy makers do not consider how seemingly unrelated policies, 
such as AB 32 or gas taxes, can have effects on land markets that vary spatially. Thus, one 
nuanced recommendation from our study is that policy makers should pay more attention 
to how transportation policies impact land values. For many households, their home is 
their single largest financial asset, and whether consciously or not, homeowners often 
behave – and vote – in ways consistent with maximizing the value of their home.
Finally, not only can taking land-market impacts into account help increase support for 
transit policies, it can also help finance transit projects. A recent report by San Francisco 
Planning and Urban Research Association (SPUR)83 estimates that in the case of HSR, 
land value capture techniques may yield revenues at $0.406 billion. This is far lower than 
other categories considered, including $15.84 billion in gas tax revenue, $9.42 billion in 
road tolls, $3.75 billion in vehicle license fees, and regional general obligation bonds (for 
San Francisco and Los Angeles) of $1 billion. The final alternative funding source the 
SPUR report identifies is money from the state’s cap and trade program. They estimate 
this amount at $13.05 billion.84 
We feel that value capture revenue can potentially be higher than estimated by SPUR. 
Unfortunately, very little is known about the magnitude by which land values rise as a 
result of various policies. Therefore, we suggest future research try to determine the extent 
to which these policies affect land values. An enhanced ability to determine which areas 
will see land values rise and fall is the key to creatively leveraging value capture to finance 
transit.
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APPENDIX A: DATA SOURCES AND CODING TECHNIQUES
In this data appendix we outline all the data sources used in this study. We discuss coding 
techniques used to match various data sources, and we present summary statistics for 
datasets used in the text but for which we did not have space to show. 
DATA BIBLIOGRAPHY
Statewide Database (SWDB). This is the source for voting data. http://statewidedatabase.
org (Accessed March 15, 2013). Data used in this study was downloaded under the pages 
titled, “2001 Redistricting Data: 1992 - 2000 Election Census Block Data,” and “2011 
Redistricting Data: 2002 - 2010 Election Census Block Data.”
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). This is the 
source for 1990 and 2000 Census data at the block group level. http://icpsr.umich.edu/ 
(Accessed March 15, 2013). Specifically, the data comes from the two studies listed below:
• U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Census of Population and Housing, 
1990 [United States]: Summary Tape File 3A. Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of 
Commerce, Bureau of the Census [producer], 1992. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1999-12-29. doi:10.3886/
ICPSR09782.v1
• U.S. Dept. of Commerce. Bureau of the Census, and Inter-university Consortium 
for Political and Social Research. Census of Population and Housing, 2000 [United 
States]: Block Group Subset From Summary File 3. ICPSR13576-v1. Ann Arbor, 
MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2004. 
doi:10.3886/ICPSR13576.v1
Social Explorer. This is the source for American Community Survey (ACS) data, five-year 
estimates (2006-2010) at the block group level. https://www.socialexplorer.com/ (Accessed 
March 15, 2013).
U.S. Census. This is the source for ACS Employment Status Data by Block Group, 2006—
2010. This was not contained in the Social Explorer files. We obtained it at the following 
web address: http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/laborfor/acs_employ.html (Accessed 
March 15, 2013).
U.S. Census. This is the source for MSA definitions used in variable calculations. 
Throughout this report we use the 2006 definitions. http://www.census.gov/population/
metro/ (Accessed March 15, 2013).
Neighborhood Change Database. This is the source for the data used in Figures 1 and 
2 and in Table 1. Essentially, this database provides historical population data for US 
Census tracts, using the 2000 tract boundaries. For more information, see http://www.
urban.org/publications/900555.html (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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UC Data. This is the source for Field Poll survey data. This study reports on analysis from 
the second 1990 survey and the fourth 2002 survey. http://ucdata.berkeley.edu/ (Accessed 
March 15, 2013).
PPIC. This is our other source for survey data. We analyzed data from the 2010 PPIC 
Statewide Survey from July 2010. The topic of this survey was “Californians and the 
Environment.” http://www.ppic.org/content/data/2010_July.zip (Accessed May 30, 2013).
CODING TECHNIQUE DISCUSSION
This section discusses coding techniques we use to allocate block group voting and 
census data across time periods. Census block groups from two periods do not necessarily 
have the same geographic boundaries; this is problematic when merging the census 
demographic data from 1990 with the election results from 1992 or 1994 that are only 
available by the Census 2000’s block group geographic boundaries. So, to establish 
a block group equivalency from year 2000 back to1990 and generate weighted voting 
results, a method of allocation based on land area is used for block groups that do not 
have matching geographic boundaries.  For this allocation, we must make the assumption 
that persons are uniformly distributed in each geographic area (block group).
This method requires the use of a geographic information system (GIS) and the Census 
TIGER/Line Shapefiles (spatial data) of all block groups for Census 1990, 2000 and 2010, 
which are publicly available from the Census site85 or alternatively from ESRI’s site.86 
The Shapefile contains the FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standards codes) and 
geographic information of each block group, which can be used to calculate the areas 
needed for the allocation.
First, 1992 voting results at the block group level are merged with the 2000 spatial data, 
based on the unique FIPS number of each block group, and then the area of each of the 
year 2000 block groups is calculated. Next, the 2000 block group Shapefile with the merged 
data is overlaid onto the 1990  block group Shapefile in order to establish a 2000-to-1990 
relationship data; the new shapes are created where the block group boundaries from the 
two layers cross and/or overlap each other. The new spatial data contain all the possible 
relationships between the two periods (although the census87 provides a relationship file 
for each of the two periods, it does not have the land area values needed for calculations, 
and it requires extra steps in order to merge the voting data).
Finally, from this new spatial data, the individual land areas are calculated and divided by 
the corresponding year 2000 land areas in order to calculate the percentage of the 2000 
land area that is contained in each 1990 block group. For example, if the year 2000 block 
group is exactly the same as that of 1990, or the entire block group is contained in a 1990 
block group, the assigned weight is 1. However, if two or more block groups merged from 
1990 or are divided, the assigned weight is less than 1. These new weights are multiplied 
by the merged voting results from previous steps, and then, all these multiple relationships 
are collapsed by their FIPS numbers, which gives us the weighted voting results. The 
same process is utilized for allocating the 1994 voting results. For allocating the 2002 
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election results with the Census 2000, the 2010 Shapefile88 is merged with 2002 voting 
data, and then weights calculated in the same way.
TABLES OF SUMMARY STATISTICS
Table 24. Summary Statistics, 1990 Field Poll Survey Data
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
FAVOR_PR_108 1,017 0.71 0.45 0 1
FAVOR_PR_111 1,112 0.59 0.49 0 1
FAVOR_PR_116 989 0.66 0.48 0 1
INCOME_L_20 1,265 0.18 0.38 0 1
INCOME_20_40 1,265 0.34 0.47 0 1
INCOME_60_P 1,265 0.23 0.42 0 1
COLLEGE 1,309 0.34 0.47 0 1
BLACK 1,309 0.04 0.18 0 1
ASIAN 1,309 0.03 0.17 0 1
HISPANIC 1,309 0.08 0.28 0 1
YOUNG 1,309 0.29 0.46 0 1
OLD 1,309 0.18 0.39 0 1
REP 1,309 0.34 0.48 0 1
HOMEOWN 1,286 0.70 0.46 0 1
Source: The California Poll (also known as The Field Poll), number 90-02, May, 1990.
Table 25. Summary Statistics, 2002 Field Poll Survey Data
Variable Observations Mean  Std. Dev. Min. Max.
FAVOR_PROP_42 797 0.66 0.47 0 1
INCOME_L_20 1,019 0.13 0.34 0 1
INCOME_20_40 1,019 0.21 0.41 0 1
INCOME_60_P 1,019 0.40 0.49 0 1
INCOME_ REFUSED 1,019 0.06 0.24 0 1
COLLEGE 1,019 0.44 0.50 0 1
BLACK 1,019 0.08 0.27 0 1
ASIAN 1,019 0.05 0.21 0 1
HISPANIC 1,019 0.16 0.37 0 1
YOUNG 1,019 0.23 0.42 0 1
OLD 1,019 0.20 0.40 0 1
REP 1,019 0.40 0.49 0 1
HOMEOWN 1,019 0.68 0.47 0 1
lnDISTANCE 925 2.93 0.83 0.27 6.61
lnDENSITY 977 7.61 1.69 1.42 10.82
Source: The California Poll (also known as The Field Poll), number 02-04, September, 2002.
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Table 26. Summary Statistics, 2000 Census and Voting Data
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
PCT_7_Y 21,970 0.45 0.09 0 1
PCT_51_Y 21,805 0.42 0.08 0 1
PCT_2_Y 21,971 0.74 0.07 0.25 1
PCT_BUSH 22,063 0.39 0.18 0 1
INC_0_25 21,965 1.26 0.17 1 2
INC_25_50 21,965 0.27 0.11 0 1
INC_50_75 21,965 0.19 0.08 0 1
INC_100_150 21,965 0.10 0.09 0 1
INC_150_P 21,965 0.07 0.10 0 1
COLLEGE 21,999 0.26 0.20 0 1
BLACK 22,007 0.06 0.13 0 1
ASIAN 22,007 0.10 0.13 0 1
OTHER 22,007 0.22 0.18 0 1
HISP 22,007 0.30 0.27 0 1
YOUNG 22,006 0.32 0.13 0 1
OLD 22,006 0.15 0.10 0 1
DOLE 21,663 0.38 0.19 0 1
HOMEOWN 21,966 0.59 0.27 0 1
lnDISTANCE 22,163 2.88 0.87 0 4.39
lnDENSITY 22,066 6.47 1.80 2.77 20.44
Sources: Census of Population and Housing, 2000, and Statewide Database (SWDB), multiple years.
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APPENDIX C: EXCERPTS FROM VOTER INFORMATION 
PAMPHLETS
Below we reproduce information from the official voter information pamphlets. These are 
the pamphlets produced by the Secretary of State and distributed to the public prior to 
elections. The University of California (Hastings College of the Law) Law Library maintains 
an archive of pamphlets from elections going back to 1911. We have modified the 
formatting of the information from these pamphlets to achieve consistency in formatting 
across elections.
PROP 108: Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1990. 
This act provides for a bond issue of one billion dollars ($1,000,000,000) to provide funds for acquisition of rights-of-
way, capital expenditures, and acquisitions of rolling stock for intercity rail, commuter rail, and rail transit programs. 
Appropriates money from state General Fund to pay off bonds. Fiscal Impact: If all authorized bonds are sold at 7.5 
percent and paid over the typical 20 year period, the General Fund will incur about $1.8 billion to pay off bond 
principal ($1 billion) and interest ($790 million). The estimated annual cost of bond principal and interest is $90 
million.
This measure authorized the state to sell $1 billion in general obligation bonds to provide funds for rail capital outlay. 
This authorization, however, would only take effect if voters approve proposition 111, The Traffic Congestion Relief 
and Spending Limitation Act of 1990. General obligation bonds are backed by the state, meaning that the state is 
obligated to pay the principal and interest cost on these bonds. General Fund revenues would be used to pay these 
costs. These revenues come primarily from the state corporate and personal income taxes and the state sales tax.
ARGUMENTS
PRO CON
Rail transit will remove thousands of automobiles from 
congested streets and highways, it will speed 
workers to and from their jobs and homes safely and 
it will reduce the dangerous pollution of the air we 
breathe. Rail transit is the key to a better 
transportation future and proposition 108, the 
Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act, will move 
California into a new era of rail transit. 
Our opposition to this measure is not based on the 
worthiness of the projects which would funded, but on 
the wisdom of increasing California’s debt burden any 
further. Last year California sold more general obligation 
bonds than any year in its history--$1.6 billion. Thomas 
Hayes, State Treasurer, anticipates sales of general 
obligation bonds in excess of $2 billion this year. 
Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1990p.pdf (accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 111: The Traffic Congestion Relief and Spending Limitation Act of 1990. 
This measure would enact a statewide traffic congestion relief program and update the spending limit on 
state and local government to better reflect the needs of a growing California population. It would 
provide new revenues to be used to reduce traffic congestion by building state highways, local streets, 
and roads, and public mass transit facilities. This measure enact a 55% increase in truck weight fees and 
a five-cent-per-gallon increase in the fuel tax on August 1, 1990, and an additional one cent on January 
1 of each of the next four years.
This measure makes changes in how the appropriations limit operates and in how the minimum funding 
guarantee for public schools and community colleges is determined. Passage of this measure also would 
cause several changes in laws relating to transportation funding to take effect.
ARGUMENTS
PRO CON
Proposition 111’s innovative transportation 
package will spend 18.5 billion over the next 10 
years to make our freeways, bridges and streets 
earthquake safe, complete highway and mass 
transit projects already authorized but not funded, 
fix potholes and increase maintenance of local 
streets and highways, reduce peak-hour traffic 
by expanding van, carpool and staggered work 
hour programs, expand local rail transit systems, 
improve traffic flow, improve state highways, and 
reduce air pollution. 
This proposition is a tax increase, pure and 
simple. It would raise your gas tax by 9 cents per 
gallon, raise sales taxes, taxes on trucks, and 
pave the way for #3 billion more of bonded 
indebtedness. Over the next ten years, these 
new taxes would total $18.5 billion or more than 
$600 per man, woman and child in California. 
For family of our, this $2,400!
Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1990p.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
PROP 116: Rail Transportation. Bond Act. Initiative Statute. 1990.
Authorizes general obligation bond issue of $1,990,000,000 to provide funds principally for passenger and 
commuter rail systems, with limited funds available for public mass transit guideways, paratransit vehicles, bicycle 
and ferry facilities, and railroad technology museum. Allocates certain amounts to specified state and local 
entities through a grant program administered by the California Transportation Commission. Program will require 
some matching funds from local entities. Appropriates money from state General Fund to pay off bonds. Fiscal 
Impact: If all authorized bonds are sold at 7.5 percent interest and paid over the typical 20-year period, the General 
Fund will incur about $3.6 billion in cost to pay off bond principal ($2 billion) and interest ($1.6 billion). The estimated 
annual cost of bond principal and interest is $180 million.
This measure authorized the state to sell $1.99 billion general obligation bonds to provide funds mostly for rail 
capital outlay. General obligation bonds are backed by the state, meaning that the state is obligated to pay the 
principal and interest cost on these bonds. General Fund revenues would be used to pay these costs. These 
revenues come primarily from the state corporate and personal income taxes and the state sales tax.
ARGUMENTS
PRO CON
A Yes vote on Proposition 116 will reduce traffic con-
gestion, help improve air quality, conserve energy, and 
protect the environment for you and your family.
This $1.99 billion Clean Air Act will neither clean the 
air or improve transportation. It will take money from 
badly needed programs including education, health 
care, child care, worthwhile transportation projects, 
and any other item in the State budget. Even More tax 
money will be needed to fund high operating costs of 
the trains.
Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1990p.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 125: Motor Vehicle Fuels Tax. Rail Transit Funding. Legislative 
Constitutional Amendment. 1990.
This measure would amend the Constitution to authorize expenditures from the revenues raised from 
state-imposed taxes on motor vehicle fuels and fees upon the operation and use of vehicles for the 
acquisition of rail transit vehicle and rail transit equipment which operate only on exclusive public mass 
transit guideways. Fiscal Impact: An unknown amount of revenues raised from the state-imposed taxes 
on motor vehicle fuels and fees upon the operation and use of vehicles may be shifted from existing 
uses for the purchase of rail transit. The extent of the shift depends upon the number of counties or 
geographic areas that approve and use these revenues for the specified purposes.
This constitutional amendment allows Article XIX revenues to be used for the acquisition of rail transit 
vehicles and rail transit guideways. These uses must first be approved by a majority of the voters in the 
county or geographic area where the revenues are to be spent.
ARGUMENTS
PRO CON
Proposition 125 improves rail transit without 
increasing taxes one cent. It allows a portion of the 
existing state gas tax, which is already allocated by 
law for mass transit capital improvements, to also 
be used to acquire rail transit rolling stock, such 
as light rail cars, rapid transit cars, and commuter/ 
intercity rail cars and locomotives. 
Proposition 125 requires that taxes be taken 
from one class of citizens—automobile and truck 
drivers—to benefit another class of citizens—the 
riders of mass rail transit, who not only pay no 
taxes for this benefit, but ride on the backs of 
those who must use gasoline-powered vehicles 
for their private and business transportation. 
Prop. 125 dictates that the cost of driving an 
automobile or truck be fixed artificially higher—so 
that the cost of using a mass rail transit system 
can be priced artificially lower.
Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1990g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
PROP 156: Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1992. Bond Act.
This Act provides for a bond issue of one billion dollars ($1,000,000,000) to provide funds for acquisition 
of rights-of-ways, capital expenditures, and acquisitions of rolling stock for intercity rail, commuter rail, 
and rail transit programs.
This measure allows the state to sell $1 billion in general obligation bonds to provide fund for rail capital 
outlay. General obligation bonds are backed by the state, meaning that the state is required to pay the 
principal and interest costs on these bonds. General Fund revenues would be used to pay these costs. 
General Fund revenues come primarily from the state personal and corporate income taxes and the 
state sales and use tax.
ARGUMENTS
PRO CON
Prop. 156 will improve and extend rail transit 
projects throughout California where needed most. 
Proposition 156 will provide jobs for California 
workers, alternatives to overcrowded freeways, 
and help people safely and efficiently. Better rail 
transit means fewer cars on the road, less gridlock 
and cleaner air. YES on 156!
Rail transit is so expensive this measure will 
finance few facilities. There are other 
transportation programs which provide much 
more benefit for fare lower costs. This measure 
will add to our budget problems. Nearly half of 
the rail bonds authorized by previous bond 
measures have still not been issued.
Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1992g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 157: Toll Roads and Highways. Legislative Constitutional Amendment. 
1992.
Provides that any toll road or toll highway owned by the state and leased to a private entity shall be 
permanently toll free upon the expiration of the lease or after tolls have been collected for a total of 35 
years, whichever occurs first. Legislature may suspend the application of the foregoing provision to any 
toll roads or toll highways by a statue passed in each house by a two-thirds vote of membership. Fiscal 
Impact: This measure would result in the potential loss of a revenue source for highway maintenance 
and operations, beginning no earlier than the year 2030. Potential loss could be tens of millions of dollar 
annually.
This Constitutional amendment band the collection of tolls on any road or highway owned by the state 
and leased to private entity after tolls have been collected for 35 years or upon expiration of lease 
(whichever occurs first). However, the Legislature could suspend the band with a two-thirds vote of each 
house. Absent a suspension, the state would no longer have the option of continuing toll collection on 
the four projects underway or any similar future projects after the leases expire or after toll have been 
collected for 35 years.
ARGUMENTS
PRO CON
Prop. 157 will take tolls off private toll roads when 
they are turned over to the state. We already pay 
taxes for the right to drive on our freeways. We 
shouldn’t have to pay expensive tolls also. Keep 
freeways free! Stop the tolls!
Prop 157 will lead to higher taxes. It will bail 
out speculators and bankers who want to build 
private highways to allow massive land 
developments. This measure would, after 35 
years, turn over to public worn out highways. 
Taxpayers will have to pay billions to repair them. 
Vote NO!
Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1992g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
PROP 181: Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1994.
This act provides for a bond issue of one billion dollars ($1,000,000,000) to provide funds for acquisition 
of rights-of-way, capital expenditures, and acquisitions of rolling stock for intercity rail, commuter rail, and 
rail transit program. Authorizes third of three bond issues of one billion dollars each, provided for by 
Statutes of 1989, Chapter 108, to finance total of three billion dollars for the long-range transportation 
plan. Voters approved the first issue in 1990, rejected the second issue in 1992.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES NO
A YES vote on this measure means: The State 
would be authorized to issue $1 billion in general 
obligation bonds to construct rail lines and related 
facilities and to acquire rights-of-way, rail cars, and 
locomotives.
A NO vote on this measure means: The State 
would not be authorized to issue $1 billion in 
general obligation bonds to construct rail lines 
and related facilities and to acquire rights-of-way, 
rail cars, and locomotives.
ARGUMENTS
PRO CON
A Yes vote on Proposition 181 will:
• Expand rail service throughout California
• Reduce traffic congestion
• Improve air quality
• Help stimulate California’s economy
This isn’t a new tax. Rather it authorizes the sale 
of $1 billion in state bonds to improve and expand 
intercity, commuter and urban rail system in 
California.
This is a billion dollar boondoggle that even the 
measure’s author, Assemblyman Jim Costa, 
agrees should not be on the ballot. Taxpayers 
shouldn’t pay for more rail projects—current 
ridership still lags behind capacity. Voters 
rejected red ink-generating bond measures in 
June. They should do it again.
Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1994g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 185: Public Transportation Trust Fund, Gasoline Sales Tax. Initiative 
Statute. 1994.
Provides for an additional 4% tax on gasoline sales. Revenues for electric rail and clean fuel buses, light 
rail, commuter and intercity rail system, and other transportation-related programs, including wetlands, 
riparian habitat and parks. Fiscal Impact: Increased gasoline sales tax revenues of about $360 million 
annually. Multimillion dollar annual increases in state and local costs for mass transportation services, 
potentially offset by unknown amount of revenues.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES NO
A YES vote on this measure means: The State 
would raise the sales tax on gasoline by 4 percent 
and use the resulting revenues to pay for (1) 
capital and operating improvements to passenger 
rail and mass transit bus services and (2) safety 
and operating improvements to streets and 
highways.
A NO vote on this measure means: The State 
would not raise the sales tax on gasoline to pay 
for 1) capital and operating improvements to 
passenger rail and mass transit bus services and 
(2) safety and operating improvements to streets 
and highways.
ARGUMENTS
PRO CON
Slash transportation waste and bureaucracy. 
Stop the Legislature from raiding transportation 
funds. Develop electric and clean fuel bus and rail 
system. Clean our air and save energy. Make road 
and bridges earthquake-safe. Provide transit for 
disabled and senior citizens. Restart California’s 
economy. Create jobs. Vote YES on 185.
Another TAX INCREASE! A $700 million annual 
SALES TAX INCREASE on gasoline. 185 is 
double taxation! 185 also creates an ALL-
POWERFUL, Sacramento COMMITTEE of 
three POLITICAL APPOINTEES with the sole 
AUTHORITY to spend billions of our taxpayers 
dollars. Our taxes already are TOO HIGH. VOTE 
NO on 185.
Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1994g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
PROP 2: Transportation Funding. Legislative Constitutional Amendment. 1998.
Imposes repayment conditions on loans of transportation revenues to the General Fund and local 
entities. Designates local transportation funds as trust funds and requires a transportation purpose for 
their use. Fiscal Impact: Not likely to have any fiscal impact on state and local governments.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES NO
A YES vote on this measure means: Additional 
restrictions would be placed on loans of state 
transportation funds to the state General Fund. In 
addition, local transportation funds from on-quarter 
cent of county sales tax could not be diverted from 
specified transportation purposes.
A NO vote on this measure means: Loans could 
continue to be made from state transportation 
funds to the General Fund without added 
restrictions. Local transportation funds derived 
from the on-quarter cent of county sales tax 
could be diverted for non-transportation 
purposes by changing state law.
ARGUMENTS
PRO CON
Proposition 2 will make sure the money you pay in 
fuel taxes is used to build and maintain 
California’s roads and transit systems. Without 
paying 1C more at the pump, you can help 
improve transportation by joining with the 
California Taxpayers Association, business, labor, 
and environmental organizations in voting “yes.”
Not Provided
Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1998g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 7: Air Quality Improvement Tax Credit. Initiative Statute. 1998.
Authorizes $218 million in state sale tax credits annually, until January 2011, to encourage air-emissions 
reductions through the acquisition, conversion, and retrofitting of vehicles and equipment. Fiscal Impact: 
Annual State revenue loss averaging tens of millions to over a hundred million dollars, to beyond 2010. 
Annually, through 2010-11: state cost of about $4.7 million; additional local revenues, potentially in the 
millions of dollars. Potential unknown long-term savings.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES NO
A YES vote on this measure means: The state 
Air Resources Board would administer a new tax 
credit program. Tax credits would be awarded 
through 2010 for various categories of projects that 
reduce emissions of pollutants into the air.
A NO vote on this measure means: The State Air 
Resources Board would not be directed to 
establish a new tax credit program designed to 
reduce emissions of pollutants into the air.
ARGUMENTS
PRO CON
American Lung Association, California Nurses 
Association, and Sacramento Chamber of 
Commerce support Proposition 7, the Air Quality 
Improvement Act. Uses Private sector tax 
incentives to reduce toxic emissions from buses 
and trucks. Cleaner air benefits the health of 
children and elderly. Creates no new bureaucracy. 
Cuts no existing programs.
Proposition 7 is corporate welfare, pure and 
simple. It gives tax breaks to the corporations 
that paid to put it on the ballot. It guarantees 
billions in taxpayers’ money to polluters, with 
no accountability or regulation in return. It takes 
money from universities, the environment and 
law enforcement. Vote No.
Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1998g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
PROP 42: Transportation Congestion Improvement Act. Allocation of Existing 
Motor Vehicle Fuel Sales and Use Tax Revenues for Transportation Purposes 
Only. Legislative Constitutional Amendment. 2002.
This measure places in the State Constitution those provisions of current law that require that, 
from2003–04 through 2007–08, gasoline sales tax revenues be used for specified state and local 
transportation purposes. The revenues would be allocated for transportation purposes specified under 
the TCRP.
The revenues would be allocated as follows: 20 percent to public transportation. 40 percent to 
transportation improvement projects funded in the State Transportation Improvement Program, a five-
year transportation capital investment program. 40 percent to local streets and roads improvements; with 
half of the amount (20 percent) allocated to counties and half to cities.
ARGUMENTS
PRO CON
Proposition 42 is based on the principle that the 
gasoline sales tax you pay when filling up your 
tank ought to be used to improve our 
transportation system. That’s exactly what Prop. 
42 does. It requires the gasoline sales tax we’re 
already paying be spent IMPROVING OUR 
HIGHWAYS, LOCAL STREETS and MASS 
TRANSIT—WITHOUT INCREASING OR 
IMPOSING ANY NEW TAXES.
PROP 42 HAS US VOTING IN 2002 ON 
SOMETHING THAT WILL NOT TAKE EFFECT 
UNTIL 2008.Do you know what California’s 
spending priorities should be in the year 2008 or 
beyond? If you don’t, then you should VOTE No 
on Prop 42.If Prop 42 passes and goes into 
effect in 2008, it will force $1.2billion in cuts in 
vital education, health care and public safety 
services. Are you sure we should be locking 
ourselves into that kind of spending priority 
today?
Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2002p.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 51: Transportation. Distribution of Existing Motor Vehicle Sales and Use 
Tax. Initiative Statute. 2002.
Redistributes portion of existing state motor vehicle sales/lease revenues from General Fund to Trust 
Fund for transportation, environmental, and highway and school bus safety programs. Fiscal Impact: 
Redirects specified General Fund revenues to transportation-related purposes, totaling about $420 
million in 2002–03, $910 million in 2003–04, and increasing amounts annually thereafter, depending on 
increases in motor vehicle sales and leasing.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES NO
A YES vote on this measure means: Thirty percent 
of the General Fund revenues generated from the 
sales tax on the lease and sale of motor vehicles 
could be used only for state and local 
transportation-related purposes, instead of 
being available for programs funded by the 
General Fund.
A NO vote on this measure means: These 
revenues would continue to be available for 
General Fund supported programs rather than 
only for state and local transportation-related 
purposes.
ARGUMENTS
PRO CON
YES on 51 dedicates EXISTING vehicle sales 
taxes to repair unsafe roads and highways, 
replace unsafe school buses, and make walk 
paths to school safer for children. Includes tough 
audit requirements. Endorsed by California Transit 
Association, Lung Association, Nurses Association, 
Safe Kids Network, firefighters, and Police Chief 
Arturo Venegas.
In a time of continuing budget deficits, 
Proposition 51 adds $1 billion to the deficit every 
year for special interest projects. It gives your tax 
dollars to campaign contributors, not California’s 
priorities. Don’t force cuts in vital services or 
require tax increases. Vote NO ON 51!
Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2002g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 1A: Transportation Funding Protection. Legislative Constitutional 
Amendment. 2006.
Protects transportation funding for traffic congestion relief projects, safety improvements, and local 
streets and roads. Prohibits the state sales tax on motor vehicle fuels from being used for any purpose 
other than transportation improvements. Authorizes loans of these funds only in the case of severe state 
fiscal hardship. Requires loans of revenues from states sales tax on motor vehicle fuels to be fully 
repaid within the three years. Restricts loans to no more than twice in any 10-year period. Fiscal Impact: 
No revenue effect or cost effects. Increases stability of funding to transportation in 2007 and thereafter.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES NO
A YES vote on this measure means: The State 
Constitution would specify additional limitations on 
the state’s ability to suspend the transfer of 
gasoline sales tax revenues from the General 
Fund to transportation. In addition, all past 
suspensions would be required to be repaid by 
June 30, 2016, at a specified minimum rate of 
repayment each year.
A NO vote on this measure means: The State 
Constitution would not further limit the state’s 
ability to suspend the transfer of gasoline sales 
tax revenues. State law, instead of the State 
Constitution, would specify when past 
suspensions would be repaid.
ARGUMENTS
PRO CON
YES on 1A dedicates taxes we already pay at the 
pump for transportation improvements like 
building roads, congestion relief, and safety 
repairs. 1A closes a loophole in the law to 
prevent politicians from spending gas taxes on 
other programs. Rebuild California: YES on 1A—
safer roads, reduced congestion, www.ReadForY-
ourself.org.
Vote “NO” on Proposition 1A! Keep Education, 
health care, and disaster relief our State’s top 
priorities. In hard economic times, “autopilot” 
budgeting causes massive unnecessary cuts to 
schools, firefighters, trauma centers, and health 
care. The Governor and Legislature must have 
flexibility to meet the needs of Californians. Vote 
“NO” on Proposition 1A.
Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2006g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 1B: Highway Safety, Traffic Reduction, Air Quality, and Port Security Bond 
Act of 2006.
This act makes safety improvements and repairs to state highways, upgrades freeways to reduce 
congestion, repairs local streets and roads, upgrades highways along major transportation corridors, 
improves seismic safety of local bridges, expands public transit, helps complete the state’s 
network of car pool lanes, reduces air pollution, and improves anti-terrorism security at shipping ports 
by providing for a bond issue not to exceed nineteen billion nine hundred twenty-five million dollars 
($19,925,000,000). Fiscal Impact: State costs of approximately $38.9 billion over 30 years to repay 
bonds. Additional unknown state and local operations and maintenance costs.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES NO
A YES vote on this measure means: The state 
could sell $19.9 billion in general obligation bonds, 
for state and local transportation improvement 
projects to relieve congestion, improve the 
movement of goods, improve air quality, and 
enhance the safety and security of the 
transportation system.
A NO vote on this measure means: The state 
could not sell $19.9 billion in general obligation 
bonds, for these purposes.
ARGUMENTS
PRO CON
YES on 1B jump-starts traffic relief, mass transit, 
and safety improvements in every corner of the 
state without raising taxes.1B builds new roads 
and transportation improvement projects that 
enhance mobility and protect our economic future. 
Rebuild California: YES on 1B—safer roads, 
reduced congestion, and a strong economy, 
www.ReadForYourself.org
California cannot afford to continue borrowing its 
way into a false sense of economic 
security. More borrowing means worsening 
budget deficits. A no vote will force the 
Legislature to focus on paying for our 
transportation needs with existing funds in a 
fiscally responsible manner. Please vote NO on 
1B.
Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2006g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 87: Alternative Energy. Research, Production, Incentives. Tax on California 
Oil Producers. Initiative Constitutional Amendment and Statute. 2006.
Establishes $4 billion program to reduce petroleum consumption through incentives for alternative 
energy, education and training. Funded by tax on California oil producers. Fiscal Impact: State oil tax 
revenues of $225 million to $485 million annually for alternative energy programs totaling $4 billion. 
State and local revenue reductions up to low tens of millions of dollars annually.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES NO
A YES vote on this measure means: The state 
would impose a tax on oil production to support 
$4 billion in expenditures to develop and promote 
alternative energy technologies and promote the 
reduction of petroleum use.
A NO vote on this measure means: The state 
would not impose a tax on oil production to fund 
these activities. 
ARGUMENTS
PRO CON
Vote YES on Prop. 87 and make oil companies 
pay their fair share for cleaner, cheaper energy. 
Oil companies pay billions in oil drilling fees in 
Alaska and Texas—but almost nothing in 
California. Prop. 87 makes oil companies pay and 
makes it illegal to pass the cost to consumers. 
$4 BILLION oil tax increase! HIGHER GAS 
PRICES. HUGE BUREAUCRACY, LACKS 
ACCOUNTABILITY. No requirement they 
produce results. DENIES REVENUES to 
SCHOOLS. We need alternative energy, but 
Proposition 87 is not the way to get there. CA 
Taxpayers’ Association, small business, labor, 
schools, police, firefighters, farmers, Auto Club 
say: Vote NO. 
Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2006g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 91: Transportation Funds. Initiative Constitutional Amendment. 
February 2008.
Prohibits certain motor vehicle fuel taxes from being retained in General Fund and delays repayment of 
such taxes previously retained. Changes how and when General Fund borrowing of certain 
transportation funds is allowed. Fiscal Impact: Increases stability of state funding for highways, streets, 
and roads and may decrease stability of state funding for public transit. May reduce stability of certain 
local funds for public transit.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES NO
A YES vote on this measure means: The 
state would no longer be able to suspend the 
transfer of gasoline sales tax revenue from 
the General Fund to transportation. In 
addition, the state would be able to loan 
specified transportation funds, potentially 
including certain local transportation funds, to 
the General Fund for essentially short-term 
cash flow purposes only. The state, however, 
may be able to loan to the General Fund, 
without express time limitation for repayment, 
certain state funds for public transit.
A NO vote on this measure means: The state would 
still be able to suspend, under certain conditions, 
the transfer of gasoline sales tax revenue from the 
General Fund to transportation. Additionally, the state 
would continue to be able, under certain conditions, 
to loan specified transportation funds to the General 
Fund for up to three fiscal years.
ARGUMENTS
PRO CON
Prop. 91 is NO LONGER NEEDED. Please 
VOTE NO. Voters passed Proposition 1A in 
2006, accomplishing what Prop. 91 set out to 
do. Prop. 1A stopped Sacramento politicians 
from taking our gas tax dollars and using 
those funds for non-transportation purposes. 
Prop. 91 is no longer needed. VOTE NO.
No argument against Proposition 91 was submitted.
Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2008p.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 1A: Safe, Reliable High-Speed Passenger Train Bond Act. Legislative 
Initiative Amendment. 2008.
To provide Californians a safe, convenient, affordable, and reliable alternative to driving and high gas 
prices; to provide good-paying jobs and improve California’s economy while reducing air pollution, global 
warming greenhouse gases, and our dependence on foreign oil, shall $9.95 billion in bonds be issued 
to establish a clean, efficient high-speed train service linking Southern California, the Sacramento/San 
Joaquin Valley, and the San Francisco Bay Area, with at least 90 percent of bond funds spent for 
specific projects, with private and public matching funds required, including, but not limited to, federal 
funds, funds from revenue bonds, and local funds, and all bond funds subject to independent audits? 
Fiscal Impact: State costs of $19.4 billion, assuming 30 years to pay both principal and interest costs of 
the bonds. Payments would average about $647 million per year. When constructed, unknown operation 
and maintenance costs, probably over $1 billion annually; at least partially, and potentially fully, offset by 
passenger fares.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES NO
A YES vote on this measure means: The state 
could sell $9.95 billion in general obligation bonds, 
to plan and to partially fund the construction of a 
high-speed train system in California, and to make 
capital improvements to state and local rail 
services.
A NO vote on this measure means: The state 
could not sell $9.95 billion in general obligation 
bonds for these purposes.
ARGUMENTS
PRO CON
California’s transportation system is broken: 
skyrocketing gasoline prices and gridlocked 
freeways and airports. High-speed trains are the 
new transportation option that reduces greenhouse 
gases and dependence on foreign oil. High-speed 
trains are cheaper than building new highways and 
airports to meet population growth and require NO 
NEW TAXES. 
Prop. 1A is a huge boondoggle. Taxpayers pay 
at least $640,000,000 per year in costs for a 
government run railroad. There’s no guarantee it 
will ever get built. Expand existing 
transportation systems instead to cut commutes 
and save fuel. No on 1A: an open taxpayer 
checkbook with virtually no accountability.
Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2008gu.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 10: Alternative Fuel Vehicles and Renewable Energy. Bonds. Initiative 
Statute. 2008.
Authorizes $5 billion in bonds paid from state’s General Fund, to help consumers and others purchase 
certain vehicles, and to fund research in renewable energy and alternative fuel vehicles. Fiscal Impact: 
State cost of about $10 billion over 30 years to repay bonds. Increased state and local revenues, 
potentially totaling several tens of millions of dollars through 2019. Potential state administrative costs up 
to about $10 million annually.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES NO
A YES vote on this measure means: The state 
could sell $5 billion in general obligation bonds for 
various renewable energy, alternative fuel, energy 
efficiency, and air emissions reduction purposes.
A NO vote on this measure means: The state 
would not sell $5 billion in general obligation 
bonds for these purposes.
ARGUMENTS
PRO CON
YES ON 10: ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND 
CLEAN AIR. PRODUCES more electricity from 
renewable sources, including solar and wind. 
GIVES Californians rebates to purchase clean 
alternative fuel vehicles. GETS polluting diesels off 
roads. INCREASES grants to California 
universities to develop cheaper alternatives to 
gasoline. REQUIRES strict accountability/audits. 
No new taxes.
Proposition 10 is special interest legislation 
which gives away $10 billion in taxpayer dollars 
to primarily benefit one company with little 
accountability and NO guarantees of 
environmental benefit. Don’t hurt our schools 
and services in a time of budget crisis. Vote NO 
on Prop. 10!
Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2008g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
PROP 22: Prohibits the State from borrowing or taking funds used for 
transportation, redevelopment, or local government projects and services. 
Initiative Constitutional Amendment. 2010.
Prohibits State, even during severe fiscal hardship, from delaying distribution of tax revenues for these 
purposes. Fiscal Impact: Decreased state General Fund spending and/or increased state revenues, 
probably in the range of $1 billion to several billions of dollars annually. Comparable increases in funding 
for state and local transportation programs and local redevelopment.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES NO
A YES vote on this measure means: The state’s 
authority to use or redirect state fuel tax and  
local property tax revenues would be significantly 
restricted.
A NO vote on this measure means: The state’s 
current authority over state fuel tax and local 
property tax revenues would not be affected.
ARGUMENTS
PRO CON
YES on 22 stops state politicians from taking local 
government funds. 22 stops the State from taking 
gas taxes voters have dedicated to transportation. 
22 protects local services: 9-1-1 emergency 
response, police, fire, libraries, transit, road 
repairs. Supported by California Fire Chiefs 
Association, California Police Chiefs Association, 
California Library Association.
California’s teachers, firefighters, nurses, and 
taxpayer advocates say NO on 22. If 22 passes, 
public schools stand to lose billions of dollars. 
22 takes money firefighters use to fight fires and 
natural disasters while protecting redevelopment 
agencies and their developer friends. Another 
proposition that sounds good, but makes things 
worse.
Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2010g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 23: Suspends implementation of air pollution control law (AB 32) requiring 
major sources of emissions to report and reduce greenhouse gas emissions that 
cause global warming, until unemployment drops to 5.5 percent or less for full 
year. Initiative statute. 2010.
Fiscal Impact: Likely modest net increase in overall economic activity in the state from suspension of 
greenhouse gases regulatory activity, resulting in a potentially significant net increase in state and local 
revenues.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES NO
A YES vote on this measure means: Certain 
existing and proposed regulations authorized 
under state law (“Assembly Bill 32”) to address 
global warming would be suspended. These 
regulations would remain suspended until the state 
unemployment rate drops to 5.5 percent or lower 
for one year.
A NO vote on this measure means: The state 
could continue to implement the measures 
authorized under Assembly Bill 32 to address 
global warming.
ARGUMENTS
PRO CON
Yes on 23 saves jobs, prevents energy tax 
increases, and helps families, while preserving 
California’s clean air and water laws. California 
can’t afford self-imposed energy costs that don’t 
reduce global warming. 2.3 million Californians are 
unemployed; Proposition 23 will save over a 
million jobs that would otherwise be destroyed. 
www.yeson23.com
Texas oil companies designed 23 to kill clean 
energy and air pollution standards in California. 
23 threatens public health with more air pollution, 
increases dependence on costly oil, and kills 
competition from job-creating California wind and 
solar companies. American Lung Association in 
California, California Professional Firefighters: 
NO on 23.
Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2010g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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AB 32 Assembly Bill 32 (Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006)
ACES American Clean Energy Act
ACS American Community Survey
CARB California Air Resources Board
CaHSRA California High-Speed Rail Authority
CBD Central Business District
GHG Greenhouse Gas
HSR High-Speed Rail
ICPSR Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research 
MPH Miles per Hour
MSA Metropolitan Statistical Area
OLS Ordinary Least Squares
PPIC Public Policy Institute of California
Prop. Proposition
R2 R-squared (Coefficient of Determination)
SPUR San Francisco Planning and Urban Research Association
SWDB Statewide Database (http://statewidedatabase.org)
ZCTA Zip Code Tabulation Areas
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berkeley.edu/library/california-ballot-measure-guides (Accessed March 10, 2013).
28. A reviewer suggested that suburban voters may support transit because either they 
believe it will: 1.) relieve congestion, or 2.) benefit low-income residents whose welfare 
they care about. These are valid points, and could be considered as a counter-
hypothesis to the one we suggest.
29. Glaeser and Kahn (2010) document that suburban households produce more 
greenhouse gas emissions from transportation and home heating than do urban 
households. Holian and Kahn (2012, 2013) confirm these findings with respect to 
transportation, using more recent data, more control variables, as well as geographically 
more refined measures of suburbanization. Matthew J. Holian and Matthew E. Kahn, 
The Impact of Center City Economic and Cultural Vibrancy on Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from Transportation (San Jose, CA: MTI Publications, 2012); Matthew J. 
Holian and Matthew E. Kahn, “The Rise of the Low Carbon Consumer City,” NBER 
Working Paper No. w18735, 2013.
30. Michael I. Cragg, Yuyu Zhou, Kevin Gurney, and Matthew E. Kahn, “Carbon Geography: 
The Political Economy of Congressional Support For Legislation Intended to Mitigate 
Greenhouse Gas Production,” Economic Inuiry 51 (2013): 1640-1650.
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31. William A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence Local 
Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2001).
32. We recognize proximity to, for example, train tracks will tend to lower value. Here, we 
refer to infrastructure such as rail stations. 
33. See Brueckner (2011), pages 46-47 for a highly readable description of this theory, 
accessible to a reader with background in college- level economic theory. Jan K. 
Brueckner, Lectures on Urban Economics (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2011).
34. Technically, the unit of analysis in our study of the voting data is the census block 
group. We merge voting data to block groups. However, it is less intuitive to describe 
“the percent of the block group voting for X,” because most readers know that in 
the U.S. voting takes place in precincts whose boundaries rarely coincide with block 
groups.
35. One final issue that has been brought up in discussions of this work is that not 
everyone votes. This has several implications. For one, the census measures will 
not perfectly summarize the electorate. Also, any social welfare measures based on 
the sample of voters will not be perfectly representative of the population as a whole. 
There are, for example, citizenship issues, spatially varying levels of apathy, and other 
sample-population correspondences to sort out. Due to time constraints, we have not 
addressed these issues here, and we leave them for future research.
36. As another way of dealing with omitted variable bias we also estimated spatial 
econometric models following Wu and Cutter (2011). We estimated this model using 
the method of maximum likelihood, implemented using the spivreg function in the Stata 
software package. In particular, we aimed to control for the omitted variables problem 
by estimating a spatial-autoregressive model with spatial-autoregressive disturbances. 
Such a model is known as an SARAR model in the field of spatial econometrics, 
and it is becoming an increasingly common model in practice. However, because 
spatial techniques represent a relatively recent econometric advance, there is not 
yet widespread agreement among applied researchers as to how spatial techniques 
should be used in analysis. (For example, Wu and Cutter estimate spatial (SARAR) 
and nonspatial (OLS) models and compare the coefficient estimates. However, 
Lesage and Dominquez (2012, p. 528) write, “…the common practice of comparing 
OLS and spatial regression coefficient estimates in public choice applications of 
spatial regression should be eliminated.”) To conserve space in a report that already 
contains many tables of regression results, we do not present the results of our spatial 
analysis here, but we note that our findings did not indicate to us that our coefficient 
estimates suffer from omitted variable bias. StataCorp, LLC, “STATA® Data Analysis 
and Statistical Software.” http://www.stata.com (Accessed May 25, 2013); LeSage, 
James P. and Matthew Dominguez. “The importance of modeling spatial spillovers 
in public choice analysis.” Public Choice 150 (2012): 528. For details on the spivreg 
function, see David M. Drukker, Prucha, Ingmar R. and Raciborski, Rafal. 2011. A 
command for estimating spatial-autoregressive models with spatial-autoregressive 
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disturbances and additional endogenous variables. The Stata Journal, Vol 1, Number 
1: 1–13.
37. This quote comes from page 71 of the 1994 General Election Voter Information 
Pamphlet. http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1994g.pdf (Accessed May 
30, 2013).
38. Ibid., 69.
39. California Legislative Information (Official), “SB 1420 Senate Bill - CHAPTERED,” 
[text of California Senate Bill SB 1420] http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96/bill/sen/
sb_1401-1450/sb_1420_bill_960924_chaptered.html (Accessed March 10, 2013).
40. California High-Speed Rail Authority (CaHSRA), “California High-Speed Rail Program 
Revised 2012 Business Plan,” (April 2012) http://www.cahighspeedrail.ca.gov/
WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=12242 (Accessed March 10, 2013). This most 
recent report was produced by KPMG. Earlier reports were produced by Charles River 
Associates in 2001, Cambridge Systematics in 2008, and Parsons Brinkerhoff in 2011. 
Comments by Rod Diridon, “California High-Speed Rail and Why It’s Important for 
the Nation,” RITA - Monthly Webcasting Event for August 15, 2012, http://mediasite.
yorkcast.com/webcast/Viewer/?peid=7b7cc7961ffc4fa9bdbf47f6c530578f1d. The 
CaHSRA website contains several of these and related documents: http://www.
cahighspeedrail.ca.gov/Business_Plan_reports.aspx (Accessed February 15, 2012).
41. The source for this quote is the 2008 Official Voter Information Guide Supplement. 
http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2008gu.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
42. Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen, and Marc Schramm, “The empirical relevance 
of the new economic geography: Testing for a spatial wage structure in Germany,” 
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 395, 2000, http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/pls/
portal/docs/1/1190850.pdf (Accessed March 10, 2013).
43. Ibid.
44. If a voter visited the CaHSRA webpage before the election, he/she would have seen a 
route map on cahighspeedrail.ca.gov that we reviewed (from 10/15/2008, http://web.
archive.org/web/20081015154427/http://www.cahighspeedrail.ca.gov/) This route 
map is identical in terms of route and stations to our Figure 5. The 2008 map listed the 
following stations names: San Francisco, SFO Airport, Redwood City/Palo Alto, San 
Jose, Gilroy, Fresno, Visalia/Tulare/Hanford, Bakersfield, Palmdale, Sylmar, Burbank, 
Los Angeles. This map also listed the following stations North of Fresno: Sacramento, 
Stockton, Modesto, Merced, and the following stations south of Los Angeles: Norwalk, 
Anaheim, Irvine, City of Industry, Ontario Airport, UC Riverside, Murrietta, Escondido, 
University City, San Diego.
45. United States Census Bureau, “Labor Force Statistics,” http://www.census.gov/hhes/
www/laborfor/acs_employ.html (Accessed March 10, 2013).
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
96
Endnotes
46. We considered and briefly experimented with an alternative coding method where 
households beyond the fringe are dropped from the sample; the results did not appear 
to differ substantially across the two methods.
47. Including only county fixed effects, the R2 is 0.4927. Including only BUSH (and no 
county fixed effects), the R2 is 0.7364.
48. To determine HSR station locations, we used the CaHSRA website “Interactive Map” 
page. The stations listed were the same as listed on the CaHSRA website on October 
15, 2008, and those listed in our Figure 5, but the more recent website also supplied 
maps of station locations, or at a minimum, the general neighborhood. The exception to 
this is the station at Visalia/Tulare/Hanford; the most recent business plan, cited in note 
15 above, confirms the general location of this station has still not been determined. 
In our distance calculations, we did not include any location for the Visalia/Tulare/
Hanford station. For all the other stations, we clicked on the station map on the HSR 
authority website, which as stated above returned a general neighborhood, and we 
then determined the centroid of this neighborhood. We then calculated the distance 
from each block group to each station location, and then found for each block group 
the minimum distance to a HSR station. Interested parties may contact us for our list of 
geocoded station locations. CaHSRA, “Interactive Map,” http://www.cahighspeedrail.
ca.gov/trip_planner.aspx (Accessed 11/11/2012).
49. Legislative bond initiatives like Prop 1A use general fund revenue to service bond 
repayment. Thus, it is not clear how new bond obligations would impact any particular 
homeowner. We admit, voters will not be sure about this either, but we believe they 
will assume that to repay these bonds either their taxes will go up, or other services 
provided by the state (e.g., highway patrol) will diminish. This is another way of saying 
that we assume homeowners do not believe in free lunches. Also, as discussed 
above, it is possible that the benefits of HSR are so large that it will generate net 
benefits even for suburban households on the urban fringe. However, given that Prop 
1A only garnered 52% of the vote, it at least appears that voters did not perceive such 
massive benefits from the project.
50. The counties we include in the Central Valley subsample are Fresno, Kern, Kings, 
Madera, Merced, San Benito, and Tulare. As of February 2013, the state legislature 
had authorized bond sales, and construction appears set to begin in July of 2013, 
(according to Vartabedian, 2013), though earlier claims by the CaHSRA, (CaHSRA 
web page: “Starting in the Central Valley,” no publish date), scheduled construction to 
begin in the second half of 2012. A recent event at San Jose State University featuring 
the current CaHSRA Board Chairperson and other speakers provided a useful picture 
of the current state of the project and areas of current contention. Eric Kurhi reported 
on this event. Ralph Vartabedian, “California still hasn’t bought land for bullet train 
route,” Los Angeles Times, January 27, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/news/local/
la-me-bullet-land-20130127,0,6688039.story (Accessed March 10, 2013); CaHSRA, 
“Starting in the Central Valley,” (no publish date cited) http://www.cahighspeedrail.
ca.gov/centralvalleystart.aspx (Accessed March 10, 2013); Eric Kurhi, “Bullet train 
chief, critic have dueling views at San Jose forum,” San Jose Mercury News, November 
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29, 2012, http://www.mercurynews.com/california-high-speed-rail/ci_22095957/
bullet-train-chief-opponent-have-dueling-views-at (Accessed March 10, 2013).
51. To conserve space we do not include a separate table of summary statistics for 
the Central Valley subsample. There are differences and similarities between this 
subsample and the statewide sample. Support for Prop. 1A was basically the same 
in both, as measured by the fraction supporting Prop. 1A, though support was slightly 
lower in the Central Valley. This is despite the fact that the average of BUSH was 0.55 
in the Central Valley (compared to 0.41 for the state as a whole). Other noticeable 
differences between summary statistics are that the value of COLLEGE is half of the 
state-level average in the Central Valley, where there are also more lower-income 
households.
52. Michael Hanemann, “How California Came to Pass AB 32, the Global Warming 
Solutions Act of 2006,” http://escholarship.org/uc/item/1vb0j4d6 (Accessed March 10, 
2013).
53. Ibid., 3.
54. Estimates of GHG emission trends in California are supplied by CARB in the 
“Trends in California Greenhouse Gas Emissions for 2000 to 2009” on the California 
Environmental Protection Agency website. According to this document, “California’s 
gross emissions of greenhouse gas decreased 1.5% between 2000 and 2009” (p. 1). 
For more information on AB 32 and associated regulations and market mechanisms, 
see “Assembly Bill 32: Global Warming Solutions Act,” also on that website. 
California Environmental Protection Agency, “Trends in California Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions for 2000 to 2009,” http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/pubs/reports/ghg_
inventory_00-09_trends.pdf (Accessed March 10, 2013); California Environmental 
Protection Agency, “Assembly Bill 32: Global Warming Solutions Act.” http://www.arb.
ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm (Accessed March 10, 2013).
55. This is from page 6 of the 2010 general election Official Voter Information Guide, 
http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2010g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
56. This is perhaps the best recent example of how California is a policy trendsetter. 
For more information, see the Sierra Club (November 2012) article. In this case, the 
first light duty vehicle GHG emission standard actually preceded AB 32, but CARB 
has continued to implement this and other regulations with identical policy goals. 
Sierra Club California, “Light Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards,” 
(November 13, 2012) http://sierraclubcalifornia.org/campaigns/drive-green-california/
light-duty-vehicle-greenhouse-gas-emissions-standards (Accessed March 10, 2013).
57. Information on these and other regulations can be found at California Environmental 
Protection Agency, “Fact Sheets / FAQs,” http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/facts/facts.htm 
(Accessed March 10, 2013).
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58. Ian W.H. Parry and Kenneth A. Small, “Should Urban Transit Subsidies Be Reduced?,” 
The American Economic Review 99 (2009): 700-724.
59. Christopher R. Knittel, “Reducing Petroleum Consumption from Transportation,” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 26 (2012): 93-118.
60. Though not as refined as our measure of these variables calculated using census 
block group centroids in the voting data.
61. We also estimate equation (2) using each of the five questions as dependent variables, 
and these results can be found in Appendix B to this report.
62. Given the relatively small sample size, a comparison of the adjusted R2 is preferred; 
here we see the value is 0.11 in column 1, and 0.22 in column 2. This means ideology 
by itself explains twice as much of the variation in support from Prop. 23 as do socio-
economic and demographic variables by themselves. 
63. Technically, because we have included county fixed-effects, this would be true for a 
Republican in Alameda County, which is the county for which we have excluded the 
county fixed effect. To prevent the statistical problem of prefect multicollinearity, one 
county fixed effect must be exclucded from each regression. In the models presented 
here and every fixed-effect model in this report we choose to exclude Alameda, simply 
because it is the first county when counties are listed in alphabetical order.
64. These results hold up to heteroskedastic-robust standard errors, both with and without 
county fixed effects. 
65. The natural log of 80 (the maximum distance to downtown assigned to a block group) 
is 4.4 (technically, ln(80)=4.38).
66. Note that lnDISTANCE ranges from 0 to 4.4., and so when we find that dPCT_23_Y/
dHOMEOWN = ((0.0141 × lnDISTANCE) - 0.0410), it is quite a large effect.
67. Both tables present full results of the unrestricted model, unlike Table 12 and Table 
14 that, to conserve space, do not report estimates for all socio-economic and 
demographic variables.
68. See Gerber et al. (2001) who discusses the effect of this proposition passing on transit 
infrastructure. Elisabeth R. Gerber, Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins, and D. 
Roderick Kiewiet, Stealing the Initiative: How State Government Responds to Direct 
Democracy (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2001).
69. California Voter Foundation, “#181 Passenger Rail And Clean Air Bond Act of 1994,” 
http://www.calvoter.org/archive/94general/props/181.html (Accessed March 10, 
2013).
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70. The results we report here for Prop. 181 are very similar to those from an identical 
analysis of Prop. 156 (from 1992), which we do not report. 
71. We do not include a table of variable descriptions as we did for the previous case 
studies, as the variables are coded in nearly identical ways. For example, the income 
categories are coded as fraction of the block group with income between zero and 
25,000, between 25,000 and 50,000, and so on. All other variables definitions are as 
above, although we did not obtain unemployment data for this analysis.
72. Future work could analyze data from all of these surveys; combining the surveys 
would have the advantage of multiplying the number of observations and lowering the 
standard errors of the estimates.
73. We do not have voting data for Prop. 42 because when we accessed the SWDB it did 
not provide data for this proposition in the same format as for the other 15 propositions 
for which we analyze voting data.
74. For the 2002 file, we first matched each county to a 1994 MSA, and then used 2000 
ZCTA Gazetteer files to determine population, land area, and geocode. Note the area 
used is reported in square miles, and land area does not account for development 
potential, water areas, or other factors. United States Census Bureau, “U.S. Gazetteer: 
2010, 2000, and 1990,” http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/gazetteer.html 
(Accessed March 10, 2013).
75. In addition to the 2010 PPIC survey, we were able to analyze two other surveys 
with zip code identifiers and questions resembling transit propositions in preparation 
of writing this report. A Field Poll survey, the fourth conducted in 1994, contained 
questions about attitudes towards gas taxes and towards green taxes and fees (such 
as higher registration fees for low mileage vehicles), and seemed to us to reflect likely 
opinions on Prop. 185 from the same year. We analyzed these data and are willing 
to share our preliminary results with interested researchers, but we decided not to 
pursue analyzing these data in the present research project as the survey questions 
were not as tightly related to Prop. 185, as for example how the questions in the PPIC 
survey were clearly related to Prop. 23. Thus, we wanted to preserve this report’s 
focus on ballot propositions, rather than shift the focus to attitudes towards green 
taxes and fees. Understanding attitudes towards environmentally friendly forms of 
taxation is an important area for future research. In addition to preliminary analysis of 
the 1994 Field Poll data, we took one additional step towards assessing the general 
area of determinates of support for green taxes and fees by analyzing the survey 
data collected by Dill, Agrawal and Nixon (2009) on attitudes among Californians in 
2008. In this analysis we found results consistent with the broad findings in this report 
concerning urban form; living farther from the center reduces support for green taxes. 
These results are more preliminary than the rest we report (i.e., the data we analyzed 
are more likely to contain coding errors or specification errors.) Despite this, it may 
be worthwhile to report here that, regarding the results of analysis of the 1994 Field 
Poll survey data on attitudes towards green taxes and fees, the results, interestingly, 
showed the same unexpected sign on lnDENSITY that we find in analysis of Prop. 
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185 using voting data. We return to this point when discussing Prop. 185, towards the 
end of this report.
76. Though, as suggested above, Prop. 111 had costs that were focused on those who 
drive more, it also had benefits that were focused on those who drive more, and 
so this, perhaps, would not have been the ideal proposition with which to test our 
hypotheses, as our hypotheses are relevant for propositions where the net benefits 
vary spatially.
77. Although we have little basis for this prediction, it would be interesting to investigate 
whether Prop. 125 failed in part because it was decided in the November election (and 
November elections have higher turnout), whereas Props. 108, 111 and 116 passed 
because they took place in the March election.
78. Prop. 157 had to do with the management of toll roads. We did not find any compelling 
theoretical reasons why urban form, ideology, or our other variables would be strongly 
related to support for this proposition. 
79. The following quote alludes to both the (special interest) controversy we mention in 
the text, as well as another idiosyncrasy regarding the 1994 election, namely a surge 
in fiscal conservative sentiment: “Voters were not in the mood to spend anything. 
Despite the efforts of the Planning and Conservation League, which sponsored 
Proposition 185, and Southern Pacific Railroad, which supported it financially up until 
the last few weeks of the campaign, voters were not convinced that a high-speed 
railway between Los Angeles and San Francisco would be worth an extra 4 percent 
tax on gasoline. It was defeated resoundingly, which was no surprise since it had 
been lagging in the polls for weeks. In fact, in mid-October, the chairman of Southern 
Pacific issued a letter stating that the company was aware of the measure’s sinking 
popularity and would no longer be giving money to the campaign. They had already 
given nearly $500,000 and stood to reap more than $600 million if it had passed. 
Opponents accused the Planning and Conservation League of tailoring the measure 
to suit a special interest. Although PCL denied the charge, the damage was already 
done. Even without special-interest rumors, it is doubtful that the measure would have 
passed; the last thing anyone wanted to propose in 1994 was a tax increase.” Kirsten 
Mangold, “Propostions 181 and 185,” California Journal (December 1994): 20-24. 
http://www.unz.org/Pub/CalJournal-1994dec-00020a02?View=PDF&apages=0022 
(Accessed March 10, 2013).
80. The positive coefficient on lnDENSITY for Prop. 1A (from 2006) is, however, inconsistent 
with the hypothesis of spatially varying net benefits, and we encounter similar findings 
above with Props. 7 and 185.
81. See Appendix C for the source of this quote.
82. The recent book by urban economist Edward Glaeser (2011) makes many of these 
same recommendations. Edward L. Glaeser, Triumph of the City (New York: Penguin 
Press, 2011).
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83. Egon Terplan and Heng Gao, “Getting High-Speed Rail On Track.” The Urbanist 515 
(2012), http://www.spur.org/publications/library/article/getting-high-speed-rail-track 
(Accessed March 10, 2013).
84. We would caution policy makers that the cap and trade money may not be as high 
as expected. It may be found that after businesses start paying for GHG emissions, 
to remain profitable, their overall tax burden will need to be reduced closer to its pre-
cap-and-trade levels, in which case, permit sales revenue may be needed to bolster 
the general fund. We strongly support a tax system that includes carbon pricing, but 
for California’s GHG mitigation legislation to be successful, it is critical to keep a focus 
on the economy, at least if by successful one means that other states will follow the 
lead of California.
85. U.S. Census Bureau, “TIGER/Line® Shapefiles and TIGER/Line® Files,” http://www.
census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/tiger-line.html (Accessed March 10, 2013).
86. The 1990 and 2000 Shapefiles for census block groups were obtained from ESRI, 
“ArcData,” http://arcdata.esri.com/data/tiger2000/tiger_download.cfm (Accessed 
March 10, 2013).
87. U.S. Census Bureau, “Census Block Relationship Files,” http://www.census.gov/geo/
www/relate/rel_blk.html (Accessed March 10, 2013).
88. The 2010 Shapefiles for census block groups were obtained from the Census, U.S. 
Census Bureau, “2010 Census TIGER/Line® Shapefiles,” http://www.census.gov/
geo/www/tiger/tgrshp2010/tgrshp2010.html (Accessed March 10, 2013).
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